

# Codebook

Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World,  
1946-2000

Forthcoming in *Electoral Studies*

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## **COUNTRY**

Names of 199 countries. These are listed in Table 1 in Appendix 1 along with the periods in which they are considered democratic. The number of legislative and presidential elections are also shown. Omissions refer to those assembly seats or electoral districts that are ignored in the dataset. More specific information on these omissions is provided in the endnotes.

## **COUNTRYNUMBER**

These are country codes that correspond to those used in the Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski (2000) dataset (ACLP).

One thing to note is that some countries are continuations of other ones in the sample:

- United Germany (191) is a continuation of West Germany (108)
- Ethiopia2, or Ethiopia after Eritrea's secession, (194) is a continuation of Ethiopia (15)
- Yugoslavia2, or Yugoslavia after Bosnia and Croatia's secessions, (192) is a continuation of Yugoslavia (128)
- Greek Cyprus, after the division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, (188) is a continuation of Cyprus (187)
- United Republic of Yemen (190) is a continuation of Yemen Arab Republic (100)

## **YEAR**

From 1946 (or year of independence) to 2000 (or respective end date of country).

## **ELECTORALSYSTEM\_NUMBER**

Indicates the number of the electoral system being used in a particular country once it enters the dataset.

An electoral system is defined as 'a set of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more successive elections are conducted in a particular democracy' (Lijphart 1994: 13). The features that characterize each electoral system are assembly size, district magnitude, the electoral formula, presidential elections, and the number of electoral tiers. A 20% criterion for changes in district magnitude and assembly size is used to determine whether there has been a change in electoral system. The introduction of presidential elections or the introduction of presidential runoffs signify a change in electoral system. The same is true for the introduction or abolition of electoral tiers. A different electoral system emerges whenever there is a change in electoral formula or in how electoral tiers are connected. Alternation between presidential, parliamentary or mixed forms of government also indicate a change in the electoral system. Finally, two electoral systems are classified as different if they are separated by a period of dictatorial rule, even if features of both systems are identical. A few examples should clarify how electoral systems have been distinguished.

- The electoral systems in the Central African Republic (1993-97, 1998-2000) are treated separately because the assembly size rose by more than 20%.
- Grenada is considered as having two electoral systems (1976-78, 1984-2000) because the systems are separated by 15 years of dictatorial rule.
- The Ukrainian electoral system 1998-2000 is distinguished from the system between 1994-97 because of the introduction of a second electoral tier for the 1998 elections.
- The Albanian electoral systems (1992-95, 1996-2000) are treated as separate because the two electoral tiers in Albania were connected for the 1992 election but not for the 1996 and 1997 elections (Shvetsova 1999).

261 different democratic electoral systems can be distinguished using the criteria given above for the period between 1946 (or independence) and 2000.

# Variables

## **AFRICA**

Dummy variable equal to one if country is in Africa, zero otherwise.

## **AVEMAG**

Average district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is calculated as the total number of seats allocated in the lowest tier divided by the total number of districts in that tier. For example, **AVEMAG**=7.94 in Denmark after 1971 since there are 135 seats allocated in the lowest tier between 17 districts. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **COEXISTENCE**

This is a dummy variable equal to one if a country uses a coexistence system in a given election and zero otherwise. A coexistence system is one in which some districts use a majoritarian formula, while others employ a proportional formula. The electoral system used in Madagascar between 1998 and 2000 is a coexistence system because 82 members of the legislature are elected in single-member districts by plurality rule, while a further 78 members are elected in two-seat districts using the highest-average Hare formula (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999). Coexistence systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems. See **MIXED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **CONDITIONAL**

A dummy variable equal to one if a conditional system is used in a given election and zero otherwise. A conditional mixed system is one in which the actual use or not of one electoral formula depends on the outcome produced by the other. The French system between 1951 and 1957 is a conditional mixed system, since all districts other than the eight in Paris applied the following electoral rule: seats will be distributed by a winner-take-all approach if a party or cartel wins a majority of the vote, but by d'Hondt otherwise (Massicotte & Blais 1999, Lijphart 1994). Conditional systems are a sub-type of dependent mixed systems. See **MIXED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **CORRECTION**

A dummy variable equal to one if a correction system is used in a given election and zero otherwise. A correction system is one in which seats distributed by proportional representation in one set of districts are used to correct the distortions created by the majoritarian formula in another. The Albanian system between 1992 and 1995 is a good example of a correction system, since the forty seats allocated in the higher tier were distributed by proportional representation based on the unused votes from single-member districts (Shvetsova 1999). Correction systems are a subtype of dependent mixed systems. See **MIXED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **D'HONDT**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the d'Hondt formula, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **DISTRICTS**

Number of electoral districts or constituencies in the lowest electoral tier for the lower house of the legislature. For example, **DISTRICTS**=17 in Denmark since there are 17 lower tier districts. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## **DROOP**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the droop quota, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**ELECSYSTEM\_TYPE**

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used.

- 1 = Majoritarian
- 2 = Proportional
- 3 = Multi
- 4 = Mixed

**ENEP**

Effective number of electoral parties based on the following formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979):

$$\frac{1}{\sum v_i^2}$$

where  $v_i$  is the percentage of the vote received by the  $i^{th}$  party. Independents or ‘others’ are treated as a single party. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9.

**ENEP\_OTHERS**

This is the percentage of the vote going to parties that are collectively known as ‘others’ in official electoral results. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9.

**ENEP1**

This is the effective number of electoral parties once the ‘other’ category has been corrected by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera (1997). The method of bounds essentially requires calculating the effective number of parties treating the ‘other’ category as a single party (smallest effective number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties as if every vote in the ‘other’ category belonged to a different party (largest effective number of parties) and taking the mean. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9. An example might prove useful. Consider the following example taken almost directly from Taagepera (1997, 150).

Party A: 40%

Party B: 30%

Party S: 10% (smallest party recorded in official results,  $P_s$ )

Others: 20% (residual, R)

Take the mean of the extremes:

1. Add ‘Others’ as 0:  $ENEP1=10,000/(40^2 + 30^2 + 10^2)=10,000/2,600 = 3.847$
2. Add ‘Others’ as the lower of  $R^2$  (here,  $20^2$ ) or  $P_s R$  ( $10 \times 20$ ):  $ENEP1=10,000/(2,600+200)=3.571$
3. Average:  $ENEP1=3.71$

**ENPP**

Effective number of parliamentary or legislative parties. Constructed using the following formula from Laakso and Taagepera (1979):

$$\frac{1}{\sum s_i^2}$$

where  $s_i$  is the percentage of the seats won by the  $i^{th}$  party. Independents or ‘others’ are treated as a single party. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9.

### **ENPP\_OTHERS**

This is the percentage of the seats going to parties that are collectively known as ‘others’ in official electoral results. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9.

### **ENPPI**

This is the effective number of parliamentary parties once the ‘other’ category has been corrected by using the least component method of bounds suggested by Taagepera(1997). The method of bounds requires calculating the effective number of parties treating the ‘other’ category as a single party (smallest effective number of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties as if every seat in the ‘other’ category belonged to a different party (largest effective number of parties) and taking the mean. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9. See **ENEP1**.

### **ENPRES**

Effective number of presidential candidates based on the following formula from Amorim Neto and Cox (1997):

$$\frac{1}{\sum v_i^2}$$

where  $v_i$  is the percentage of the vote received by the  $i^{th}$  candidate. ‘Others’ are treated as a single candidate. Compiled using various sources listed in Appendix 9.

### **FUSEDVOTE**

A dummy variable equal to one if a fused vote was used for presidential and legislative elections and zero otherwise. A fused vote is when a citizen casts a single ballot for the elections of more than one political office. This particular variable captures when the single ballot is for the presidency and the legislature. Citizens are unable to divide their votes among the candidates or lists of different parties. Split-ticket voting is expressly prohibited. An example is the case of Uruguay. For more information, see Jones (2000). Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

### **FUSION**

A dummy variable equal to one if a fusion electoral system is used and zero otherwise. A fusion system is one in which majoritarian and proportional formulas are used within a single district. The Turkish system between 1987 and 1994 can be considered a fusion system since a ‘contingency mandate’ was used in which the first seat in a constituency was allocated under plurality rule. The remaining seats were allocated using the d’Hondt formula. Fusion systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems. See **MIXED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

### **HARE**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the hare formula, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

### **IMPERIALI**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the Imperiali quota, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

### **INSTITUTION**

Classification of political regimes in which democracies are distinguished by the type of executive (0 Dictatorship, 1 Parliamentary Democracy, 2 Mixed Democracy, 3 Presidential Democracy). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges. For the criteria for determining whether a regime is a dictatorship see **REGIME**. A presidential regime is one in which the government serves at the pleasure of the elected president. The president may be directly elected or indirectly elected; the important feature is that the president selects and determines the survival of the government. A parliamentary system is one in which the government serves

so long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature. A system in which the government must respond both to the legislative assembly and to an elected president is classified as mixed. Mixed systems have also been referred to as ‘semi-presidential’, ‘premier-presidential’, or ‘president-parliamentary’ (Duverger 1980, Shugart 1992). Typically, these mixed systems are characterized by a president who is elected for a fixed term with some executive powers and a government that serves at the discretion of the legislature. This classification scheme follows the recommendations of Przeworski et al. (2000). This variable is taken from the ACLP dataset. Parliamentary, mixed and presidential regimes are listed in Appendix 4.

#### **LEG\_ALTERNATIVE**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the alternative vote, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **LEG\_BORDA**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified borda count, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **LEGELEC**

Indicates the number of full democratic elections for the national lower chamber of the legislature held in that year. Partial elections such as those taking place in Costa Rica 1946, Poland 1989, Laos 1958, or Luxembourg 1948, 1951 are coded 0. This variable does not include elections to constituent assemblies such as those in Pakistan 1955, Nicaragua 1984, Sudan 1965, 1968, Italy 1946, or France 1946. It also excludes the 1960 election in Somalia since this was only a legislative election for Somaliland (later to become the northern region of Somalia). This variable is constructed using sources listed in Appendix 9. 9 countries had two democratic elections in the same year:

- Bangladesh 1996
- Denmark 1953
- Greece 1989
- Iceland 1959
- Ireland 1982
- Sri Lanka 1960
- St. Lucia 1987
- Thailand 1992
- United Kingdom 1974

2 countries had two dictatorial elections in the same year:

- Thailand 1957
- Yugoslavia 1992

18 democratic legislative elections occur in years where REGIME is coded as a dictatorship (Argentina 1962, Bolivia 1980, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Congo 1963, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Pakistan 1977, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965, Sierra Leone 1967, Somalia 1969, Sri Lanka 1977, Sudan 1958, Thailand 1976). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of REGIME is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic. Legislative elections that occurred under dictatorship are listed in Appendix 2. See **REGIME**.

**LEG\_LIMITED**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the limited vote, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**LEG\_MAJORITY**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses absolute majority provisions, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**LEG\_PLURALITY**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses plurality rule, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**LEG\_QUALMAJORITY**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses a qualified majority requirement, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**LEG\_RUNOFF**

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no legislative runoff; 1 if there is. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**LEG\_SNTV**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the single non-transferable vote, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MAJORITARIAN**

Dummy variable indicating whether a country employs a majoritarian electoral system. Majoritarian systems include those that use plurality rule as well as those that employ absolute and qualified majority requirements. Other majoritarian electoral systems also included are the limited vote (Argentina 1948-50, 1958-61), alternative vote (Australia), the single non-transferable vote (Japan, Vanuatu) and a form of modified Borda count (Nauru).

- Limited Vote: Voters have fewer votes than there are seats to be filled. Candidates are ranked by the total number of votes received and the top candidates are then selected for election until the constituency seats are filled. Since the limited vote formula was often adopted in larger constituencies in order to secure the representation of minorities, some scholars classify this formula as semi-proportional (Lijphart 1994, Lijphart, Pintor & Sone 1986).
- SNTV: Single non-transferable vote systems are similar except that each voter is only allowed to cast one vote in the multi-member districts. The candidates with the most votes are elected until the constituency seats are filled. Again, this system is sometimes considered semi-proportional.
- Alternative Vote: Requires voters to rank-order candidates. If a candidate obtains an absolute majority of first preferences, he/she is elected. If not, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated and his/her voters are re-distributed among the remaining candidates. This procedure is repeated until one candidate reaches an absolute majority.
- Modified Borda Count: This is very similar to the traditional alternative vote except that first preferences count as one vote, second preferences for a half vote, third preferences for one third of a vote etc. For more details on this, see Nohlen, Grotz and Hartman (2001*a*).

Each of these systems require successful candidates to win either a plurality or majority of the vote. As a result, they are considered majoritarian. Majoritarian electoral systems are listed in Appendix 5. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MEDMAG**

Median district magnitude in the lowest electoral tier. This is the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier. The median legislator is determined by finding the number of legislators elected in the lower tier and dividing by two. For further details on this variable see Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Golder (2003). Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MIXED**

Dummy variable indicating whether a country uses a mixed electoral system. A mixed system is one in which a mixture of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules are used. A country can be classified as having a mixed system whether it uses one or more electoral tiers; in practice, most mixed systems have more than one tier. Mixed electoral systems can be divided into those in which the two electoral formulas are dependent and those in which they are independent. See **MIXED\_DEPENDENT**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MIXED\_DEPENDENT**

This is a dummy variable that equals one when the two electoral formulas used in a mixed system are dependent, and zero otherwise. A dependent mixed system is one in which the application of one formula is dependent on the outcome produced by the other formula. An independent mixed system is one in which the two electoral formulas are implemented independently of each other. For example, the Russian electoral system is independent because the application of proportional representation in the higher tier does not depend in any way on the distribution of votes and/or seats determined by plurality rule at the constituency level. On the other hand, the German electoral system is dependent because proportional representation is applied in the higher tier so as to correct the distortions in proportionality caused by the plurality formula at the district level. Massicotte and Blais (1999) argue that independent mixed systems can be divided into coexistence, superposition and fusion types. Dependent mixed systems can be divided into correction and conditional types. See **COEXISTENCE**, **SUPERPOSITION**, **FUSION**, **CORRECTION**, and **CONDITIONAL**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MOD\_HARE**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified hare formula, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MOD\_SAINTE-LAGUE**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the modified Sainte-Laguë formula, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MULTI**

Dummy variable that indicates whether a country uses a multi-tier system. A multi-tier system is one in which a single electoral formula (majoritarian or proportional) is used in multiple electoral tiers. It is possible to distinguish between majoritarian and proportional multi-tier systems. Only Papua New Guinea and Mauritius use majoritarian multi-tier systems. Multi-tier systems can be divided into those in which the multiple tiers are linked and those in which they are not. See **MULTI\_LINKED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**MULTI\_LINKED**

A dummy variable equal to one when a multi-tier electoral system has linked tiers and zero otherwise. Linkage occurs whenever unused votes from one electoral tier are used at another level or if the allocation of seats in one tier is conditional on the seats received in another tier (Shvetsova 1999). Multi-tier systems that employ a single ballot are not necessarily linked systems. A single ballot implies that the same vote tally is used in both tiers, but it does not signify whether the same votes are used in a linked or unlinked. Thus, it is possible for multi-tier systems with a single ballot to be classified as unlinked. This turns out to be the

case for the Albanian election of 1996. Likewise, separate ballots can be used in linked and unlinked ways. See **MULTI**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **NEWDEM**

Dummy variable equal to one if this is the first legislative election since independence or the first elections since a transition to democracy, zero otherwise.

#### **PRESELEC**

Indicates whether there was a direct presidential election held in that year. This variable does not signify that the election chose either the nominal or effective head of government. For example, **PRESELEC**=1 if there is an election for president in mixed systems, even though the nominal and effective head of government is the prime minister. This variable does not include plebiscites or referenda as have occurred in countries like Taiwan and the Maldiv Islands. This variable is constructed using various sources listed in Appendix 9. One country has had two presidential elections in the same year:

- Argentina 1973

8 democratic presidential elections occur in years where **REGIME** is coded as a dictatorship (Bolivia 1980, Costa Rica 1948, Guatemala 1982, Nigeria 1983, Panama 1968, Peru 1962, 1990, Philippines 1965). This apparent anomaly arises because the classification of **REGIME** is based on the regime as of December 31st in the given year. The elections mentioned above occurred prior to the transition to dictatorship in these years and should be considered democratic. Presidential elections that occurred under dictatorship are listed in Appendix 2. See **REGIME**.

#### **PRESELECSYSTEM\_TYPE**

Variable that indicates the type of electoral system used in presidential elections.

- 1 = Plurality
- 2 = Absolute majority
- 3 = Qualified majority
- 4 = Electoral College
- 5 = STV

#### **PRES\_COLLEGE**

Dummy variable equal to one if the president is elected using an electoral college, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **PRES\_MAJORITY**

Dummy variable equal to one if the president is elected using an absolute majority runoff, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10. See **PRES\_RUNOFF**.

#### **PRES\_PLURALITY**

Dummy variable equal to one if the president is elected using plurality rule, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **PRES\_QUALMAJORITY**

Dummy variable equal to one if the president is elected using a qualified majority requirement, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10. See **PRES\_RUNOFF**.

#### **PRES\_STV**

Dummy variable equal to one if the president is elected using the single transferable vote, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

## PRES\_RUNOFF

Dummy variable coded 0 if there is no presidential runoff; 1 if there is a presidential runoff. Presidential elections are coded as having runoff provisions if a successful candidate must win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote to become president. In an absolute majority system a candidate must win over 50% of the popular vote to become president. If no candidate overcomes this threshold in the first round, then there is a runoff between the top two candidates. Qualified majority systems are only slightly different. Each qualified majority system specifies a particular percentage of the vote that a candidate must win in order to be elected in the first round. This threshold ranges from a low of 33% in the Peruvian presidential elections of 1956 and 1963 to a high of 55% for the 1996 election in Sierra Leone (Jones 1995, Nohlen 1993a, Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999). If two or more candidates overcome these thresholds, then the one with the highest number of votes wins. The qualified majority systems vary in terms of the electoral procedure that applies when these thresholds are not met. Some countries have employed a runoff between the top two candidates from the first round (Argentina, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Finland). Other countries indirectly elect the president using either electoral colleges, the parliament or joint sessions of the bicameral legislature (Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Peru, Finland). This variable is compiled from the sources listed in Appendix 10.

## PROPORTIONAL

This is a dummy variable indicating whether a country uses a proportional electoral formula with a single electoral tier. Proportional electoral systems can be divided into two types: those that use party lists and those like the single transferable vote that do not. Those systems employing lists can themselves be divided into two further categories: quota systems (with allocation of remainders) and highest average systems.

### 1. Quota Systems

- Hare Quota:  $\frac{Valid\ Votes}{Seats}$ .
- Droop Quota (Hagenbach-Bischoff):  $\frac{Valid\ Votes}{Seats+1}$ . If the Droop quota turns out to be an integer, then a one is often added. Thus, the quota would be  $\frac{Valid\ Votes}{Seats+1} + 1$ .
- Imperiali Quota:  $\frac{Valid\ Votes}{Seats+2}$ .
- Reinforced Imperiali Quota:  $\frac{Valid\ Votes}{Seats+3}$ .

There are several ways to distribute any unallocated seats in quota systems:

- Largest remainder: unallocated seats are given to the parties with the largest remainders.
  - Highest Average: Divide the number of votes obtained by each party by the number of seats that party obtained in the initial allocation. This provides an average number of votes that was actually used to win a seat. Unallocated seats are then given to the parties with the highest average.
  - Modified Highest Average: Divides the number of votes obtained by each party by the number of already-allocated seats plus one.
2. Highest Average Systems In these systems, the votes that parties receive are divided by a series of numbers. Seats are allocated to the parties that have the highest average. These systems do not produce any unallocated seats.
- D'Hondt: Uses the series 1, 2, 3, 4 ... as the divisor.
  - Sainte-Laguë: Uses the series 1, 3, 5, 7 ... as the divisor
  - Modified Sainte-Laguë: Uses the series 1.4, 3, 5, 7 ... as the divisor.
3. Single-Transferable Vote: Requires voters to rank single candidates in order of the most to least preferred. Votes are transferred until candidates obtain the Droop quota. Candidates that obtain this quota are elected.

For more information, see Caramani (2000), Cox (1997) and Lijphart (1994). Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 9.

#### **PROXIMITY1**

A continuous variable from 0 to 1 measuring the proximity of presidential and legislative elections. Legislative and presidential elections that are held concurrently are coded as 1. If legislative elections are midterm elections or if the regime has no direct presidential elections, then PROXIMITY2 is coded 0. The proximity variable is constructed as follows:

$$PROXIMITY2 = 2 * \left| \frac{L_t - P_{t-1}}{P_{t+1} - P_{t-1}} - 1/2 \right|$$

where  $L_t$  is the year of the legislative election,  $P_{t-1}$  is the year of the previous presidential election, and  $P_{t+1}$  is the year of the next presidential election. The more proximal the non-concurrent elections, the higher the PROXIMITY2 score. For further details on the construction of this variable see Amorim Neto and Cox (1997). Constructed based on **ELECTION** and **PRESELEC**.

#### **PROXIMITY2**

A dummy variable measuring the proximity of presidential and legislative elections. Coded 0 if presidential and legislative elections are not in the same year; 1 if presidential and legislative elections are concurrent. Constructed based on **ELECTION** and **PRESELEC**.

#### **REGIME**

Classification of political regimes as democracies and dictatorships. Transition years are coded as the regime that exists (0 Democracy, 1 Dictatorship) as of December 31st in that year. A regime is considered a dictatorship if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alternation in power (Przeworski et al. 2000, Przeworski et al. 1996). In other words, a regime is democratic if those who govern are selected through contested elections. This variable is an updated and corrected version of the same variable in the ACLP dataset.

#### **REGIME\_LEG**

This is the same as REGIME except that it is coded 0 (Democracy) instead of 1 (Dictatorship) for those 18 democratic legislative elections that occurred prior to a transition to dictatorship but where REGIME is coded as a dictatorship. See **LEGELEC**, **PRESELEC**, **REGIME**.

#### **REGIME\_PRES**

This is the same as REGIME except that it is coded 0 (Democracy) instead of 1 (Dictatorship) for those 8 democratic presidential elections that occurred prior to a transition to dictatorship but where REGIME is coded as a dictatorship. See **LEGELEC**, **PRESELEC**, **REGIME**.

#### **REGION**

Region of the world as found in the ACLP dataset.

1. Sub-Saharan Africa
2. South Asia
3. East Asia
4. South East Asia
5. Pacific Islands/Oceania
6. Middle East/North Africa
7. Latin America
8. Caribbean and non-Iberic America

9. Eastern Europe/Soviet Union
10. Industrial countries
11. Oil countries

#### **REGION1**

Geographic regions of the world.

1. Sub-Saharan Africa
2. South Asia
3. East Asia
4. South East Asia
5. Pacific Islands/Oceania
6. Middle East/North Africa
7. Latin America
8. Caribbean and non-Iberic America
9. Eastern Europe/Soviet Union
10. Western Europe

The countries included in each region are shown in Table in Appendix 3.

#### **REINFORCED\_IMPERIALI**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the reinforced Imperiali quota, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **SAINTE-LAGUË**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the Sainte-Laguë formula, zero otherwise. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **SEATS**

Total number of seats in the lower house of the legislature during the election year. Any seats that have been omitted are specifically listed in Table 1 in Appendix 1. Changes in the number of seats are shown for the first election in which they are used. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **STV**

Dummy variable that equals one if the legislative election in the lower tier uses the single transferable vote, zero otherwise.

#### **SUPERPOSITION**

This is a dummy variable that equals one when there is a superposition electoral system. A superposition system is one in which two different electoral formulas are applied nationwide. Japan represents an example of a superposition system since 300 representatives are elected by plurality rule in single-member districts, while a further 190 are elected by proportionality in eleven districts in a higher tier. Superposition systems are a sub-type of independent mixed systems. See **MIXED**. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

#### **TWOLELECTIONS**

A dummy variable equal to one if a country had two legislative elections in that year.

#### **UPPERSEATS**

The number of seats allocated in electoral districts or constituencies above the lowest tier.

This variable may include seats allocated in several different upper tiers. For example, the number of upper tier seats in Hungary includes 58 seats allocated in a single national district and 152 seats allocated in 20 regional districts. Sources for this variable are listed in Appendix 10.

**UPPERTIER**

Percentage of seats allocated in electoral districts above the lowest tier. This is **SEATS** divided by **UPPERSEATS**.

## Appendix 1: Overview

The countries and elections included in the dataset are listed in Table 1 along with the periods in which they are considered democratic. Table 1 also lists the number of legislative and presidential elections that have occurred during democratic periods in each country. It also explicitly indicates the seats and districts that have been excluded when listing the number of assembly seats and calculating the average district magnitude.

Table 1: Legislative and Presidential Elections in 199 Countries, 1946-2000

Country	Democratic Periods	Number of Elections		Exclusions
		Legislative	Presidential	
Afghanistan	Never	—	—	—
Albania	1992-2000	3	0	—
Algeria	Never	—	—	—
Andorra	1993-2000	2	0	—
Angola	Never	—	—	—
Antigua	1981-2000	4	0	speaker and ex-officio member
Argentina	1946-1954 1958-1961 1963-65 1973-1975 1983-2000	19	10	—
Armenia	1991-2000	2	3	—
Australia	1946-2000	22	0	—
Austria	1946-2000	16	10	—
Azerbaijan	Never	—	—	—
Bahamas	1973-2000	5	0	—
Bahrain	Never	—	—	—
Bangladesh <sup>1</sup>	1991-2000	3	0	women seats
Barbados	1966-2000	8	0	—
Belarus	Never	—	—	—
Belgium	1946-2000	18	0	—
Belize	1981-2000	4	0	—
Benin	1991-2000	3	2	—
Bhutan	Never	—	—	—
Bolivia	1979 1982-2000	6	6	—
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Never	—	—	—
Botswana	Never	—	—	—
Brazil	1946-1963 1979-2000	10	6	—
Brunei	Never	—	—	—
Bulgaria	1990-2000	4	2	—
Burkina Faso	Never	—	—	—
Burundi	Never	—	—	—
Cambodia	Never	—	—	—
Cameroon	Never	—	—	—
Canada	1946-2000	17	0	—
Cape Verde	1991-2000	2	2	—
Central African Republic	1993-2000	2	2	—
Chad	Never	—	—	—
Chile	1946-1972 1990-2000	9	7	—
China	Never	—	—	—
Colombia <sup>2</sup>	1946-1948 1958-2000	17	12	black community, overseas seats
Comoros	1990-1994	2	1	—
Congo	1960-1962 1992-1996	3	2	—
Costa Rica	1946-1947 1949-2000	13	13	—
Croatia	1991-2000	3	3	—

Table 1: Legislative and Presidential Elections in 199 Countries, 1946-2000

Country	Democratic Periods	Number of Elections		Exclusions
		Legislative	Presidential	
Cuba	1946-1951	3	1	—
Cyprus	1960-1982	4	1	Turkish Cypriots
Czechoslovakia	1990-1992	2	0	—
Czech Republic	1993-2000	2	0	—
Denmark	1946-2000	21	0	Faroe Islands, Greenland
Djibouti	Never	—	—	—
Dominica	1978-2000	5	0	—
Dominican Republic	1966-2000	9	10	—
East Germany	Never	—	—	—
Ecuador	1948-1962 1979-2000	15	10	—
Egypt	Never	—	—	—
El Salvador	1984-2000	6	4	—
Equatorial Guinea	Never	—	—	—
Eritrea	Never	—	—	—
Estonia	1991-2000	3	0	—
Ethiopia	Never	—	—	—
Ethiopia <sup>2</sup>	Never	—	—	—
Fiji	Never	—	—	—
Finland	1946-2000	15	9	—
France	1946-2000	14	6	Dom-Toms, Algeria
Gabon	Never	—	—	—
Gambia	Never	—	—	—
Georgia	Never	—	—	—
Germany	1990-2000	3	0	—
Ghana	1970-1971 1979-1980	1	1	—
Greece	1946-1966 1974-2000	19	0	—
Greek Cyprus	1983-2000	3	4	Turkish Cypriots
Grenada	1974-1978 1984-2000	5	0	—
Guatemala	1946-1953 1958-1962 1966-1981 1986-2000	14	10	—
Guinea	Never	—	—	—
Guinea-Bissau	Never	—	—	—
Guyana <sup>3</sup>	1992-2000	2	2	indirectly elected
Haiti	1994-2000	2	2	—
Honduras <sup>4</sup>	1957-1962 1971 1982-2000	6	6	compensatory seats
Hungary	1990-2000	3	0	—
Iceland	1946-2000	17	15	—
India <sup>5</sup>	1947-2000	12	0	Anglo-Indian community military appointees
Indonesia <sup>6</sup>	1999-2000	1	0	—
Iran	Never	—	—	—
Iraq	Never	—	—	—
Ireland	1946-2000	16	9	—
Israel	1948-2000	15	0	—
Italy	1946-2000	13	0	—
Ivory Coast	Never	—	—	—
Jamaica	1962-2000	9	0	—
Japan	1947-2000	20	0	—
Jordan	Never	—	—	—
Kazakhstan	Never	—	—	—
Kenya	Never	—	—	—
Kiribati <sup>7</sup>	1979-2000	6	6	ex officio member, Banaban community

Table 1: Legislative and Presidential Elections in 199 Countries, 1946-2000

Country	Democratic Periods	Number of Elections Legislative	Number of Elections Presidential	Exclusions
Kuwait	Never	—	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	1991-2000	2	3	—
Laos	1954-1958	1	0	—
Latvia	1991-2000	3	0	—
Lebanon	1946-1974	8	0	—
Lesotho	Never	—	—	—
Liberia	Never	—	—	—
Libya	Never	—	—	—
Liechtenstein	1990-2000	2	0	—
Lithuania	1991-2000	3	2	—
Luxembourg	1946-2000	10	0	—
Macedonia	1991-2000	2	2	—
Madagascar	1993-2000	2	1	—
Malawi	1994-2000	2	2	—
Malaysia	Never	—	—	—
Maldive Islands	Never	—	—	—
Mali <sup>8</sup>	1992-2000	2	2	overseas seats
Malta	1964-2000	8	0	—
Marshall Islands	1991-2000	3	0	—
Mauritania	Never	—	—	—
Mauritius	1968-2000	7	0	—
Mexico	2000-	1	1	—
Micronesia <sup>9</sup>	1991-2000	5	0	—
Moldova	1996-2000	1	1	—
Mongolia	1992-2000	3	2	—
Morocco	Never	—	—	—
Mozambique	Never	—	—	—
Myanmar	1948-1957 1960-1961	3	0	—
Namibia <sup>10</sup>	1990-2000	2	2	presidential appointees
Nauru	1968-2000	12	0	—
Nepal	1991-2000	3	0	minority and women seats
Netherlands	1946-2000	16	0	—
New Zealand	1946-2000	19	0	—
Nicaragua <sup>11</sup>	1984-2000	2	3	unsuccessful presidential candidates
Niger	1993-1995	2	1	—
Nigeria	1960-1965 1979-1982 1999-2000	4	3	—
North Korea	Never	—	—	—
Norway	1946-2000	13	0	—
Oman	Never	—	—	—
Pakistan <sup>12</sup>	1947-1955 1972-1976 1988-1997	5	0	non-muslim and women seats
Palau	1994-2000	2	2	—
Panama	1949-1950 1952-1967 1989-2000	8	8	—
Papua New Guinea	1975-2000	5	0	—
Paraguay	Never	—	—	—
Peru	1946-1947 1956-1961 1963-1967 1980-1989	6	6	—
Philippines	1946-1964 1986-2000	10	9	appointed seats, indirectly elected
Poland	1989-2000	3	3	—
Portugal <sup>13</sup>	1976-2000	9	6	overseas seats
Qatar	Never	—	—	—

Table 1: Legislative and Presidential Elections in 199 Countries, 1946-2000

Country	Democratic Periods	Number of Elections		Exclusions
		Legislative	Presidential	
Republic of Yemen	Never	—	—	—
Romania	1990-2000	4	3	minority seats
Russia	1991-2000	3	3	—
Rwanda	Never	—	—	—
San Marino	1992-2000	2	0	—
Sao Tome and Principe	1991-2000	3	2	—
Saudi Arabia	Never	—	—	—
Senegal	Never	—	—	—
Seychelles	Never	—	—	—
Sierra Leone <sup>14</sup>	1961-1966 1996-2000	3	1	tribal seats
Singapore	Never	—	—	—
Slovak Republic	1993-2000	2	1	—
Slovenia <sup>15</sup>	1991-2000	3	2	minority seats
Solomon Islands	1978-2000	4	0	—
Somalia	1960-1968	2	0	—
Somaliland	Never	—	—	—
South Africa	1994-2000	2	0	—
South Korea	1960 1988-2000	5	3	—
Spain	1977-2000	8	0	—
Sri Lanka <sup>16</sup>	1948-1976 1989-2000	10	2	governor appointees
St. Kitts and Nevis	1983-2000	5	0	—
St. Lucia	1979-2000	6	0	—
St. Vincent	1979-2000	5	0	—
Sudan	1956-1957 1965-1968 1986-1988	2	0	—
Suriname	1975-1979 1988-1989 1991-2000	4	0	—
Swaziland	Never	—	—	—
Sweden	1946-2000	17	0	—
Switzerland	1946-2000	14	0	—
Syria	Never	—	—	—
Taiwan	1996-2000	1	2	—
Tajikistan	Never	—	—	—
Tanzania	Never	—	—	—
Thailand	1975 1983-1990 1992-2000	9	0	—
Togo	Never	—	—	—
Tonga	Never	—	—	—
Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2000	8	0	—
Tunisia	Never	—	—	—
Turkey	1961-1979 1983-2000	10	0	—
Turkmenistan	Never	—	—	—
Uganda <sup>17</sup>	1980-1984	1	—	indirectly elected
Ukraine	1991-2000	2	3	—
United Arab Emirates	Never	—	—	—
United Kingdom	1946-2000	14	0	—
United States	1946-2000	28	14	District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
Uruguay	1946-1972 1985-2000	10	10	—
U.S.S.R.	Never	—	—	—

Table 1: Legislative and Presidential Elections in 199 Countries, 1946-2000

Country	Democratic Periods	Number of Elections		Exclusions
		Legislative	Presidential	
Uzbekistan	Never	—	—	—
Vanuatu	1980-2000	5	0	—
Venezuela	1946-1947 1959-2000	10	10	—
Vietnam	Never	—	—	—
Western Samoa	Never	—	—	—
West Germany	1949-1989	11	0	West Berlin
Yemen	Never	—	—	—
(North, Sana)				
Yemen PDR	Never	—	—	—
(South, Aden)				
Yugoslavia	Never	—	—	—
Yugoslavia2	Never	—	—	—
Zaire	Never	—	—	—
Zambia	1991-2000	2	2	—
Zimbabwe	Never	—	—	—
Total		867	294	

## Appendix 2: Dictatorial Elections

Table 2 indicates the number of legislative and presidential elections that have occurred each year under democracy and dictatorship.

Table 2: Legislative and Presidential Elections under Democracy and Dictatorship

Country	Democratic Periods	Democratic Elections		Dictatorial Elections	
		Legislative	Presidential	Legislative	Presidential
Afghanistan	Never	—	—	9	0
Albania	1992-2000	3	0	11	0
Algeria	Never	—	—	6	7
Andorra	1993-2000	2	0	0	0
Angola	Never	—	—	2	1
Antigua	1981-2000	4	0	0	0
Argentina	1946-1954	19	10	0	0
	1958-1961	—	—	—	—
	1963-65	—	—	—	—
	1973-1975	—	—	—	—
	1983-2000	—	—	—	—
Armenia	1991-2000	2	3	0	0
Australia	1946-2000	22	0	0	0
Austria	1946-2000	16	10	0	0
Azerbaijan	Never	—	—	2	4
Bahamas	1973-2000	5	0	0	0
Bahrain	Never	—	—	1	0
Bangladesh	1991-2000	3	0	4	3
Barbados	1966-2000	8	0	0	0
Belarus	Never	—	—	2	1
Belgium	1946-2000	18	0	0	0
Belize	1981-2000	4	0	0	0
Benin	1991-2000	3	2	5	4
Bhutan	Never	—	—	0	0
Bolivia	1979	6	6	8	6
	1982-2000	—	—	—	—
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Never	—	—	3	2
Botswana	Never	—	—	7	0
Brazil	1946-1963	10	6	4	0
	1979-2000	—	—	—	—
Brunei	Never	—	—	0	0
Bulgaria	1990-2000	4	2	10	0
Burkina Faso	Never	—	—	5	4
Burundi	Never	—	—	3	2
Cambodia	Never	—	—	8	1
Cameroon	Never	—	—	9	8
Canada	1946-2000	17	0	0	0
Cape Verde	1991-2000	2	2	2	0
Central African Republic	1993-2000	2	2	2	3
Chad	Never	—	—	5	2
Chile	1946-1972	9	7	1	2
	1990-2000	—	—	—	—
China	Never	—	—	0	0
Colombia	1946-1948	17	12	2	1
	1958-2000	—	—	—	—
Comoros	1990-1994	2	1	3	3
Congo	1960-1962	3	2	4	0
	1992-1996	—	—	—	—
Costa Rica	1946-1947	13	13	0	0
	1949-2000	—	—	—	—
Croatia	1991-2000	3	3	0	0
Cuba	1946-1951	3	1	7	2
Cyprus	1960-1982	4	1	0	0
Czechoslovakia	1990-1992	2	0	8	0
Czech Republic	1993-2000	2	0	0	0
Denmark	1946-2000	21	0	0	0

Table 2: Legislative and Presidential Elections under Democracy and Dictatorship

Country	Democratic Periods	Democratic Elections		Dictatorial Elections	
		Legislative	Presidential	Legislative	Presidential
Djibouti	Never	—	—	5	4
Dominica	1978-2000	5	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	1966-2000	9	10	4	4
East Germany	Never	—	—	9	0
Ecuador	1948-1962 1979-2000	15	10	2	1
Egypt	Never	—	—	11	9
El Salvador	1984-2000	6	4	14	6
Equatorial Guinea	Never	—	—	4	4
Eritrea	Never	—	—	0	0
Estonia	1991-2000	3	0	0	0
Ethiopia	Never	—	—	5	0
Ethiopia2	Never	—	—	2	0
Fiji	Never	—	—	7	0
Finland	1946-2000	15	9	0	0
France	1946-2000	14	6	0	0
Gabon	Never	—	—	8	8
Gambia	Never	—	—	7	4
Georgia	Never	—	—	3	4
Germany	1990-2000	3	0	0	0
Ghana	1970-1971 1979-1980	1	1	4	4
Greece	1946-1966 1974-2000	19	0	0	0
Greek Cyprus	1983-2000	3	4	0	0
Grenada	1974-1978 1984-2000	5	0	0	0
Guatemala	1946-1953 1958-1962 1966-1981 1986-2000	14	10	2	2
Guinea	Never	—	—	4	6
Guinea-Bissau	Never	—	—	5	2
Guyana	1992-2000	2	2	4	0
Haiti	1994-2000	2	2	13	5
Honduras	1957-1962 1971 1982-2000	6	6	3	5
Hungary	1990-2000	3	0	10	0
Iceland	1946-2000	17	15	0	0
India	1947-2000	12	0	0	0
Indonesia	1999-2000	1	0	7	0
Iran	Never	—	—	10	6
Iraq	Never	—	—	10	0
Ireland	1946-2000	16	9	0	0
Israel	1948-2000	15	0	0	0
Italy	1946-2000	13	0	0	0
Ivory Coast	Never	—	—	9	9
Jamaica	1962-2000	9	0	0	0
Japan	1947-2000	20	0	0	0
Jordan	Never	—	—	12	0
Kazakhstan	Never	—	—	3	2
Kenya	Never	—	—	9	7
Kiribati	1979-2000	6	6	0	0
Kuwait	Never	—	—	10	0
Kyrgyzstan	1991-2000	2	3	0	0
Laos	1954-1958	1	0	7	0
Latvia	1991-2000	3	0	0	0
Lebanon	1946-1974	8	0	3	0
Lesotho	Never	—	—	3	0
Liberia	Never	—	—	9	9
Libya	Never	—	—	5	0
Liechtenstein	1990-2000	2	0	0	0
Lithuania	1991-2000	3	2	0	0

Table 2: Legislative and Presidential Elections under Democracy and Dictatorship

Country	Democratic Periods	Democratic Elections		Dictatorial Elections	
		Legislative	Presidential	Legislative	Presidential
Luxembourg	1946-2000	10	0	0	0
Macedonia	1991-2000	2	2	0	0
Madagascar	1993-2000	2	1	6	5
Malawi	1994-2000	2	2	7	0
Malaysia	Never	—	—	10	0
Maldives Islands	Never	—	—	6	0
Mali	1992-2000	2	2	5	2
Malta	1964-2000	8	0	0	0
Marshall Islands	1991-2000	3	0	0	0
Mauritania	Never	—	—	6	6
Mauritius	1968-2000	7	0	0	0
Mexico	2000-	1	1	18	9
Micronesia	1991-2000	5	0	0	0
Moldova	1996-2000	1	1	1	1
Mongolia	1992-2000	3	2	12	0
Morocco	Never	—	—	6	0
Mozambique	Never	—	—	4	2
Myanmar	1948-1957	3	0	5	0
	1960-1961				
Namibia	1990-2000	2	2	0	0
Nauru	1968-2000	12	0	0	0
Nepal	1991-2000	3	0	3	0
Netherlands	1946-2000	16	0	0	0
New Zealand	1946-2000	19	0	0	0
Nicaragua	1984-2000	2	3	6	6
Niger	1993-1995	2	1	5	5
Nigeria	1960-1965	4	3	2	1
	1979-1982				
	1999-2000				
North Korea	Never	—	—	10	0
Norway	1946-2000	13	0	0	0
Oman	Never	—	—	1	0
Pakistan	1947-1955	5	0	2	0
	1972-1976				
	1988-1997				
Palau	1994-2000	2	2	0	0
Panama	1949-1950	8	8	4	2
	1952-1967				
	1989-2000				
Papua New Guinea	1975-2000	5	0	0	0
Paraguay	Never	—	—	15	15
Peru	1946-1947	6	6	3	3
	1956-1961				
	1963-1967				
	1980-1989				
Philippines	1946-1964	10	9	3	3
	1986-2000				
Poland	1989-2000	3	3	10	0
Portugal	1976-2000	9	6	8	2
Qatar	Never	—	—	0	0
Republic of Yemen	Never	—	—	2	1
Romania	1990-2000	4	3	10	0
Russia	1991-2000	3	3	0	0
Rwanda	Never	—	—	5	5
San Marino	1992-2000	2	0	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe	1991-2000	3	2	2	0
Saudi Arabia	Never	—	—	0	0
Senegal	Never	—	—	8	8
Seychelles	Never	—	—	5	5
Sierra Leone	1961-1966	3	1	4	2
	1996-2000				
Singapore	Never	—	—	8	0

Table 2: Legislative and Presidential Elections under Democracy and Dictatorship

Country	Democratic Periods	Democratic Elections		Dictatorial Elections	
		Legislative	Presidential	Legislative	Presidential
Slovak Republic	1993-2000	2	1	0	0
Slovenia	1991-2000	3	2	0	0
Solomon Islands	1978-2000	4	0	0	0
Somalia	1960-1968	2	0	2	1
Somaliland	Never	—	—	0	0
South Africa	1994-2000	2	0	11	0
South Korea	1960	5	3	11	6
	1988-2000				
Spain	1977-2000	8	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	1948-1976	10	2	0	2
	1989-2000				
St. Kitts & Nevis	1983-2000	5	0	0	0
St. Lucia	1979-2000	6	0	0	0
St. Vincent	1979-2000	5	0	0	0
Sudan	1956-1957	2	0	4	5
	1965-1968				
	1986-1988				
Suriname	1975-1979	4	0	1	0
	1988-1989				
	1991-2000				
Swaziland	Never	—	—	6	0
Sweden	1946-2000	17	0	0	0
Switzerland	1946-2000	14	0	0	0
Syria	Never	—	—	10	2
Taiwan	1996-2000	1	2	9	0
Tajikistan	Never	—	—	2	3
Tanzania	Never	—	—	8	8
Thailand	1975	9	0	8	0
	1983-1990				
	1992-2000				
Togo	Never	—	—	7	6
Tonga	Never	—	—	10	0
Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2000	8	0	0	0
Tunisia	Never	—	—	10	7
Turkey	1961-1979	10	0	4	1
	1983-2000				
Turkmenistan	Never	—	—	2	1
Uganda	1980-1984	1	0	1	1
Ukraine	1991-2000	2	3	0	0
United Arab Emirates	Never	—	—	0	0
United Kingdom	1946-2000	14	0	0	0
United States	1946-2000	28	14	0	0
Uruguay	1946-1972	10	10	1	1
	1985-2000				
U.S.S.R	Never	—	—	11	0
Uzbekistan	Never	—	—	3	2
Vanuatu	1980-2000	5	0	0	0
Venezuela	1946-1947	10	10	1	1
	1959-2000				
Vietnam	Never	—	—	5	0
Western Samoa	Never	—	—	11	0
West Germany	1949-1989	11	0	0	0
Yemen	Never	—	—	2	0
(North, Sana)					
Yemen PDR (South, Aden)	Never	—	—	2	0
Yugoslavia	Never	—	—	11	0
Yugoslavia2	Never	—	—	4	3
Zaire	Never	—	—	7	3
Zambia	1991-2000	2	2	6	5
Zimbabwe	Never	—	—	9	2
Total		867	294	737	300

## Appendix 3: Countries and Geographic Regions

Table illustrates the countries that are included in each geographical region for the variable **REGION1**.

Region	Countries
Sub-Saharan Africa	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ethiopia <sup>2</sup> , Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Somaliland, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
South Asia	Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldive Islands, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
East Asia	China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan.
South East Asia	Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
Pacific Islands/Oceania	Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, Western Samoa.
Middle East/North Africa	Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (North Sana), Yemen (South Aden).
Latin America	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Caribbean and non-Iberic America	Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States.
Eastern Europe/Former Soviet Union	Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, U.S.S.R., Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia <sup>2</sup> .
Western Europe	Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greek Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, West Germany.

## Appendix 4: Presidential, Parliamentary and Mixed Regimes

Tables 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the years in which countries had presidential, parliamentary or mixed regimes.

Table 4: Presidential Regimes, 1946-2000

Country	Years	Number of Direct Presidential Elections	Electoral Formula
Plurality			
Argentina	1951-54	1	Plurality
Brazil	1946-60	3	Plurality
	1963	0	
Colombia	1946-48	1	Plurality
	1958-93	9	Plurality
Congo	1960-62	1	Plurality
Cuba	1946-51	1	Plurality
Dominican Republic	1966-1995	8	Plurality
Ecuador	1948-62	4	Plurality
Guyana	1992-2000	2	Plurality
Honduras	1957-62	1	Plurality
	1971	1	Plurality
	1982-2000	4	Plurality
Malawi	1994-2000	2	Plurality
Mexico	2000	1	Plurality
Nicaragua	1984-1995	2	Plurality
Nigeria <sup>18</sup>	1979-83	2	Plurality
	1999-2000	1	Plurality
Panama	1949-50	0	
	1952-68	5	Plurality
	1989-2000	3	Plurality
Philippines	1946-65	6	Plurality
	1986-2000	3	Plurality
South Korea	1988-2000	2	Plurality
Uruguay	1946-72	7	Plurality
	1985-98	2	Plurality
Venezuela	1946-47	1	Plurality
	1959-2000	9	Plurality
Zambia	1996-2000	1	Plurality
Majoritarian			
Argentina <sup>19</sup>	1973-75	2	Absolute Majority
	1995-2000	2	Qualified Majority
Armenia	1991-94	1	Absolute Majority
Benin	1991-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Bolivia <sup>20</sup>	1979-80	2	Qualified Majority
	1982-2000	4	Qualified Majority
Brazil	1982-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Chile <sup>21</sup>	1946-72	5	Qualified Majority
	1990-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Colombia	1994-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Costa Rica <sup>22</sup>	1946-48	1	Qualified Majority
	1949-2000	12	Qualified Majority
Cyprus	1960-82	1	Absolute Majority
Dominican Republic	1996-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Ecuador <sup>23</sup>	1979-1997	5	Absolute Majority
	1998-2000	1	Qualified Majority

Table 4: Presidential Regimes, 1946-2000

Country	Years	Number of Direct Presidential Elections	Electoral Formula
El salvador	1984-2000	4	Absolute Majority
Ghana	1979-80	1	Absolute Majority
Greek Cyprus	1983-2000	4	Absolute Majority
Guatemala <sup>24</sup>	1946-53	1	Qualified Majority
	1958-62	1	Qualified Majority
	1966-82	5	Qualified Majority
	1986-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Kyrgyzstan	1991-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Namibia	1990-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Nicaragua <sup>25</sup>	1996-2000	1	Qualified Majority
Palau	1994-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Peru <sup>26</sup>	1946-47	0	
	1956-62	2	Qualified Majority
	1963-67	1	Qualified Majority
	1980-84	1	Qualified Majority
	1985-90	2	Absolute Majority
Russia	1991-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Sierra Leone <sup>27</sup>	1996-2000	1	Qualified Majority
Ukraine <sup>1</sup>	1991-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Uruguay	1999-2000	1	Absolute Majority
Zambia	1991-95	1	Absolute Majority
Electoral College			
Argentina	1946-50	1	Electoral College
	1958-61	1	Electoral College
	1963-65	1	Electoral College
	1983-1994	2	Electoral College
United States <sup>28</sup>	1946-2000	14	Electoral College
No Direct Presidential Elections			
Indonesia	1999-2000	0	
Micronesia	1991-2000	0	
San Marino	1992-2000	0	
Switzerland	1946-2000	0	
Uganda	1980-84	0	

Table 5: Parliamentary Regimes, 1946-2000

Country	Years	Country	Years
Andorra	1993-2000	Myanmar	1948-57
Antigua	1981-2000		1960-61
Australia	1946-2000	Nauru	1968-2000
Austria*	1946-2000	Nepal	1991-2000
Bahamas	1973-2000	Netherlands	1946-2000
Bangladesh	1991-2000	New Zealand	1946-2000
Barbados	1966-2000	Nigeria	1960-65
Belgium	1946-2000	Norway	1946-2000
Belize	1981-2000	Pakistan	1947-55
Bulgaria*	1990-2000		1988-97
Canada	1946-2000	Papua New Guinea	1975-2000
Cape Verde*	1991-2000	Sierra Leone	1961-66
Czech Republic	1993-2000	Slovak Republic*	1993-2000
Czechoslovakia	1990-92	Slovenia*	1991-2000
Denmark	1946-2000	Solomon Islands	1978-2000
Dominica	1978-2000	South Korea* <sup>29</sup>	1960
Estonia	1991-2000	Spain	1977-2000
France	1946-57	Sri Lanka	1948-76
Germany	1990-2000	St. Kitts & Nevis	1983-2000
Ghana	1970-71	St. Lucia	1979-2000
Greece	1946-66	St. Vincent	1979-2000
	1974-2000	Sudan1	1956-57
Grenada	1974-78		1965-68
	1984-2000		1986-88
Hungary	1990-2000	Surinam	1975-79
India	1947-2000	Sweden	1946-2000
Ireland*	1946-2000	Thailand	1975
Israel	1948-2000		1983-90
Italy	1946-2000		1992-2000
Jamaica	1962-2000	Trinidad & Tobago	1962-2000
Japan	1947-2000	Turkey	1961-79
Kiribati <sup>30</sup>	1979-2000		1983-2000
Laos	1954-58	United Kingdom	1946-2000
Latvia	1991-2000	Vanuatu	1980-2000
Lebanon	1946-74	West Germany	1949-89
Liechtenstein	1990-2000		
Luxembourg	1946-2000		
Macedonia*	1991-2000		
Malta	1964-2000		
Marshall Islands	1991-2000		
Mauritius	1968-2000		
Moldova*	1996-2000		

\* Indicates that there are also direct presidential elections in these periods.

Table 6: Mixed Regimes, 1946-2000

Country	Years	Number of Direct Presidential Elections	Electoral Formula
Plurality			
Iceland	1946-2000	15	Plurality
Taiwan	1996-2000	2	Plurality
Majoritarian			
Armenia	1995-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Central African Republic	1993-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Comoros	1990-94	1	Absolute Majority
Congo	1992-96	1	Absolute Majority
Croatia	1991-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Finland <sup>31</sup>	1988-93	1	Qualified Majority
	1994-2000	2	Absolute Majority
France	1958-2000	6	Absolute Majority
Haiti	1994-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Lithuania	1991-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Madagascar	1993-2000	1	Absolute Majority
Mali	1992-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Mongolia	1992-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Niger	1993-95	1	Absolute Majority
Poland	1989-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Portugal	1976-2000	6	Absolute Majority
Romania	1990-2000	3	Absolute Majority
Sao Tome & Principe	1991-2000	2	Absolute Majority
Electoral College			
Finland <sup>32</sup>	1946-87	6	Electoral College
Proportional Representation			
Sri Lanka	1989-2000	2	STV
No Direct Presidential Elections			
Albania	1992-2000	0	
Brazil	1961-62	0	
Pakistan	1972-76	0	
Somalia	1960-68	0	
South Africa	1994-2000	0	
Surinam	1988-1989	0	
	1991-2000	0	

## Appendix 5: Majoritarian Electoral Systems

Table 7 illustrates the basic features of majoritarian electoral systems. The table indicates which electoral system is being described for each country. For example, Canada1 indicates that this is the first electoral system used in Canada between 1946 and 2000, while Argentina2 indicates that this is the second electoral system employed in this period. This is the same practice used by Lijphart (1994). The table also provides information relating to (1) the number of legislative elections that occurred in this electoral system, (2) the time period in which this system was employed, (3) the electoral formula used to allocate seats, (4) the average district magnitude, and (5) the number of electoral districts, and (6) the number of assembly seats.

Table 7: Majoritarian Electoral Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
1. Plurality Systems					
Antigua1	4: 1984-2000	Plurality	1	17	17
Argentina3 <sup>33</sup>	1: 1951-53	Plurality	10.53	15	158
Argentina4	1: 1954	Plurality	4.56	17	155
Bahamas1	5: 1977-2000	Plurality	1	43.8	43.8
Bangladesh1	3: 1991-2000	Plurality	1	300	300
Barbados1	1: 1966-70	Plurality	2	12	24
Barbados2	7: 1971-2000	Plurality	1	26.57	26.57
Belize1	4: 1984-2000	Plurality	1	28.5	28.5
Canada1	17:1949-2000	Plurality	1	275.41	275.41
Congo1	1: 1960-63	Plurality	9.17	6	55
Dominica1	5: 1980-2000	Plurality	1	21	21
Ghana1	1: 1979-80	Plurality	1	140	140
Greece4	1: 1952-55	Plurality	3.03	99	300
Grenada1	1: 1976-78	Plurality	1	15	15
Grenada2	4: 1984-2000	Plurality	1	15	15
India1	2: 1952-61	Plurality	1.21	396	480.5
India2	10:1962-2000	Plurality	1	528.1	528.1
Jamaica1	9: 1962-2000	Plurality	1	56.78	56.78
Laos1	1: 1955-58	Plurality	???	???	39
Lebanon3 <sup>34</sup>	1: 1953-56	Plurality	1.33	33	44
Lebanon4	1: 1957-59	Plurality	2.54	26	66
Lebanon5	4: 1960-74	Plurality	3.81	26	99
Malawi1	2: 1994-2000	Plurality	1	184.5	184.5
Marshall Islands1	3: 1991-2000	Plurality	1.38	24	33
Micronesia1 <sup>35</sup>	5: 1991-2000	Plurality	1	12.4	12.4
Mongolia1	1: 1992-95	Plurality	2.92	26	76
Myanmar1	2: 1951-57	Plurality	1	250	250
Myanmar2	1: 1960-61	Plurality	1	250	250
Nepal1	3: 1991-2000	Plurality	1	205	205
New Zealand1	17: 1946-95	Plurality	1	86.47	86.47
Nigeria1	1: 1964-65	Plurality	1	469	469
Nigeria2	2: 1979-83	Plurality	1	449.5	449.5
Nigeria3	1: 1999-2000	Plurality	1	360	360
Pakistan1	1: 1977	Plurality	1	200	200
Pakistan2	4: 1988-97	Plurality	1	207	207
Palau1	2: 1996-2000	Plurality	1	16	16
Philippines1	6: 1946-65	Plurality	1	101.67	101.67
Philippines2	3: 1986-97	Plurality	1	201.33	201.33
Sierra Leone1	2: 1962-67	Plurality	1	64	64
Solomon Islands1	2: 1980-92	Plurality	1	38	38
Solomon Islands2	2: 1993-2000	Plurality	1	48.5	48.5
South Korea1	1: 1960	Plurality	1	233	233
Sri Lanka1	2: 1952-59	Plurality	1	89	89

Table 7: Majoritarian Electoral Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Sri Lanka2	5: 1960-77	Plurality	1	149.6	149.6
St. Kitts & Nevis1	5: 1984-2000	Plurality	1	11	11
St. Lucia1	6: 1979-2000	Plurality	1	17	17
St. Vincent1	5: 1979-2000	Plurality	1	17	17
Sudan1	1: 1958	Plurality	1	173	173
Sudan2	1: 1986-88	Plurality	1	264	264
Thailand1	2: 1975-76	Plurality	???	???	269
Thailand2	3: 1983-90	Plurality	2.48	138	342.67
Thailand3	4: 1992-2000	Plurality	2.53	148.75	376
Trinidad1	8: 1966-2000	Plurality	1	36	36
Uganda1	1: 1980-84	Plurality	1	126	126
United Kingdom1	14: 1950-2000	Plurality	1	636.79	636.79
United States1	28:1946-2000	Plurality	1	434.12	434.12
Zambia1	1: 1991-95	Plurality	1	150	150
Zambia2	1: 1996-2000	Plurality	1	150	150

## 2. Majoritarian Systems

Argentina1	1: 1946-47	Limited Vote	10.53	15	158
Argentina2	1: 1948-50	Limited Vote	5.27	15	158
Argentina5	1: 1958-59	Limited Vote	8.13	23	187
Argentina6	2: 1960-62	Limited Vote	4.17	23	192
Australia1	1: 1946-48	AV	1	75	75
Australia2	21:1949-2000	AV	1	131.05	131.05
Central African Republic1	1: 1993-97	Abs. Maj.	1	85	85
Central African Republic2	1: 1998-2000	Abs. Maj.	1	109	109
Comoros1	2: 1992-94	Abs. Maj.	1	42	42
Congo2	2: 1992-96	Abs. Maj.	1	125	125
France3	7: 1958-85	Abs. Maj.	1	470.14	470.14
France5	3: 1988-2000	Abs. Maj.	1	569.67	569.67
Haiti1	2: 1995-2000	Abs. Maj.	1	83	83
Japan1	18: 1947-95	SNTV	3.95	123.28	487.44
Kiribati1	6: 1982-2000	Abs. Maj.	1.66	23	38
Kyrgyzstan1	1: 1995-99	Abs. Maj.	1	70	70
Lebanon1	1: 1947-50	Abs. Maj.	11	5	55
Lebanon2 <sup>36</sup>	1: 1951-52	Qual. Maj.	8.56	9	77
Macedonia1	1: 1994-97	Abs. Maj.	1	120	120
Mali1	1: 1992-96	Abs. Maj.	2.11	55	116
Mali2	1: 1997-2000	Abs. Maj.	2.67	55	147
Mongolia2 <sup>37</sup>	2: 1996-2000	Qual. Maj.	1	76	76
Nauru1	12: 1971-2000	Mod. Borda Count	2.25	8	18
Ukraine1	1: 1994-97	Abs. Maj.	1	450	450
Vanuatu1	5: 1983-2000	SNTV	3.06	15.2	46.6

## Appendix 6: Proportional Representation Electoral Systems

Table 8 illustrates the basic features of proportional representation electoral systems. The table provides information relating to (1) the number of legislative elections that occurred in this electoral system, (2) the time period in which this system was employed, (3) the electoral formula used to allocate seats, (4) the average district magnitude, (5) the number of electoral districts, and (6) the number of assembly seats.

Table 8: Proportional Representation Systems

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
1. Quota Systems					
Benin1	1: 1991-94	LR-Hare	10.67	6	64
Benin2	1: 1995-98	HA-Hare	4.67	18	84
Benin3	1: 1999-2000	HA-Hare	3.5	24	84
Bolivia1	2: 1979-80	LR-Hare	13.72	9	123.5
Bolivia2	2: 1985-92	LR-Hare	14.44	9	130
Brazil1 <sup>38</sup>	1: 1947-49	Hare	13	22	286
Brazil5	1: 1998-2000	HA-Hare	19	27	513
Colombia1	2: 1947-49	LR-Hare	???	???	131.5
Colombia2 <sup>39</sup>	7: 1953-73	No Formula			181.14
Colombia3 <sup>40</sup>	5: 1974-90	LR-Hare	7.65	26	199
Colombia4	1: 1991-93	LR-Hare	4.88	33	161
Colombia5	2: 1994-2000	LR-Hare	4.88	33	161
Costa Rica1	3: 1948-61	LR-Hare	6.43	7	45
Costa Rica2	10:1962-2000	LR-Hare	8.14	7	57
Ecuador1	6: 1952-62	LR-Hare	???	???	???
El Salvador1	2: 1985-90	LR-Hare	4.29	14	60
Guatemala1	2: 1950-53	???-Hare	3.09	22	68
Guatemala2	3: 1958-62	???-Hare	3	2	66
Guyana1	2: 1992-2000	LR-Hare	53	1	53
Honduras1	1: 1957-62	LR-Hare	???	???	58
Honduras2	1: 1971	LR-Hare	???	???	64
Honduras3 <sup>41</sup>	4: 1985-2000	LR-Hare	7.11	18	128
Indonesia1	1: 1999-2000	LR-Hare	17.11	27	462
Israel2	6: 1951-72	LR-Hare	120	1	120
Liechtenstein1 <sup>42</sup>	2: 1993-2000	LR-Hare	12.5	2	25
Luxembourg1	10:1954-2000	Mod. HA-Droop	14.46	4	57.8
Madagascar1	1: 1993-97	LR-Hare	2.34	57	138
Namibia1	2: 1994-2000	LR-Hare	72	1	72
Nicaragua1 <sup>43</sup>	1: 1990-95	Hare	10	9	90
Panama1	3: 1952-63	???-Hare	5.3	10	53
Panama2	2: 1964-68	???-Hare	???	10	???
Peru1 <sup>44</sup>	2: 1956-62	???-Hare	7.58	24	182
Peru2	1: 1963-67	???-Hare	5.79	24	139
Peru3	3: 1980-90	???-Hare	7.11	25	180
Sierra Leone2	1: 1996-2000	LR-Hare	68	1	68
Slovak Republic2	1: 1998-2000	LR-Droop	150	1	150
Somalia1	2: 1964-69	LR-Hare	2.62	47	123
2. Highest Average Systems					
Argentina7	1: 1963-64	d'Hondt	8.35	23	192
Argentina8	1: 1965	d'Hondt	4.17	23	192
Argentina9	1: 1973-75	d'Hondt	5.06	24	243

Table 8: Proportional Representation Systems

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Argentina10	1: 1983-84	d'Hondt	5.29	24	254
Argentina11	5: 1985-94	d'Hondt	5.34	23.8	254.2
Argentina12	3: 1995-2000	d'Hondt	5.38	24	257
Bolivia3	1: 1993-96	Sainte-Laguë	14.44	9	130
Brazil2	3: 1950-61	d'Hondt	12.75	25	318.67
Brazil3	1: 1962-63	d'Hondt	15.56	25	389
Brazil4	4: 1982-97	d'Hondt	18.88	26.25	495.5
Bulgaria2	3: 1991-2000	d'Hondt	7.74	31	240
Cape Verde1	1: 1991-94	d'Hondt	3.16	25	79
Cape Verde2	1: 1995-2000	d'Hondt	3.79	19	72
Chile1	7: 1949-73	d'Hondt	5.26	28.14	1478.14
Chile2	2: 1993-2000	d'Hondt	2	60	120
Cuba1	3: 1946-51	???	???	???	68.33
Dominican Republic1	2: 1966-73	d'Hondt	2.47	27	74
Dominican Republic2	2: 1974-81	d'Hondt	3.37	27	91
Dominican Republic3	4: 1982-97	d'Hondt	4.11	29.25	120
Dominican Republic4	1: 1998-2000	d'Hondt	5	30	150
Finland1	13: 1948-1994	d'Hondt	13.33	15	200
Finland2	2: 1995-2000	d'Hondt	13.33	15	200
France1	1: 1946-50	d'Hondt	5.33	102	544
France4	1: 1986-87	d'Hondt	5.79	96	556
Guatemala3	5: 1966-82	d'Hondt	2.70	22	59.4
Israel1	1: 1948-50	d'Hondt	120	1	120
Israel3 <sup>45</sup>	8: 1973-2000	d'Hondt	120	1	120
Latvia1	3: 1993-2000	Sainte-Laguë	20	5	100
Moldova1	1: 1998-2000	d'Hondt	104	1	104
Netherlands1	3: 1946-55	d'Hondt	100	1	100
Netherlands2	13: 1956-2000	d'Hondt	150	1	150
Norway1	1: 1949-52	d'Hondt	5.17	29	150
Norway2	9: 1953-88	Modified Sainte-Laguë	7.8	19.56	152.44
Portugal1	9: 1976-2000	d'Hondt	12.04	20	240.78
San Marino1	1: 1993-2000	d'Hondt	6	10	60
Sao Tome & Principe1	3: 1991-2000	d'Hondt	7.86	7	55
Spain1	8: 1977-2000	d'Hondt	6.73	52	349.63
Suriname2	3: 1991-2000	d'Hondt	5.1	10	51
Sweden1	1: 1948-51	d'Hondt	8.21	28	230
Sweden2	6: 1952-69	Modified Sainte-Laguë	8.27	28	231.67
Switzerland1	14:1947-2000	d'Hondt	7.95	25	198.71
Turkey1 <sup>46</sup>	1: 1961-64	d'Hondt	6.72	67	450
Turkey3	3: 1969-79	d'Hondt	6.72	67	450
Turkey4	1: 1983-86	d'Hondt	5.42	83	450
Turkey6	2: 1995-2000	d'Hondt	6.59	83.5	550
Uruguay1 <sup>47</sup>	7: 1946-72	d'Hondt	99	1	99
Uruguay2	1: 1989-93	d'Hondt	99	1	99
Uruguay3	2: 1994-2000	d'Hondt	99	1	99
Venezuela1	1: 1946-47	d'Hondt	4.78	23	110
Venezuela5	1: 2000	d'Hondt	6.88	24	165

## 3. Non-Party List Systems

Ireland1	16:1948-2000	STV	3.79	40.56	154.63
Malta1	4: 1966-86	STV	5.13	11.5	58.75

## Appendix 7: Multi-Tier Systems

Table 9 describes the features of multi-tier systems. An ‘L’ indicates the electoral district, while ‘H’ indicates the higher tier; if there are more than one higher tier, then ‘H’ is subscripted to indicate this. Both tables attempt to provide information on the electoral formula, the district magnitude and the number of seats allocated in each tier. However, this is not always possible. For example, the number of remainder seats allocated in a higher tier in quota-based systems will depend on the actual election results. In several cases the distribution of seats in upper tiers is quite complex and idiosyncratic to a particular country. This is certainly the case in most of the Greek electoral systems (Caramani 2000, Clogg 1987, Vergelis 1981, Lijphart 1994). As a result, it is not always possible to systematically indicate the number of seats and district magnitudes used in upper tiers in these countries.

Table 9: Multi-Tier Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Linked Multi-Tier Systems						
Austria1	7: 1949-1970	L	Droop	6.6	25	165
		H	d'Hondt	41.25	4	
Austria2	6: 1971-1993	L	Hare	20.33	9	183
		H	d'Hondt	91.5	2	
Austria3 <sup>48</sup>	3: 1994-2000	L	Hare	4.26	43	183
		H <sub>1</sub>	Hare	20.33	9	
		H <sub>2</sub>	d'Hondt	183	1	
Belgium1 <sup>49</sup>	16: 1946-94	L	d'Hondt	7.08	30	211.38
		H	LR-Hare	23.49	9	
Belgium2	2 1995-2000	L	d'Hondt	7.5	20	150
		H	LR-Hare	13.64	11	
Cyprus1	3: 1960-80	L	???	5.83	6	35
		H	???	???	???	
Cyprus2 <sup>50</sup>	1: 1981-82	L	Hare	5.83	6	35
		H		35	1	
Czech Republic1	2: 1996-2000	L	Droop	25	8	200
		H	LR-Droop	200	1	
Czechoslovakia1	2: 1990-92	L	Droop	12.5	12	150
		H	LR-Droop	150	1	
Denmark1	3: 1947-53	L	d'Hondt	4.74	23	148.67
		H	LR-Hare	39.67	1	
Denmark2	6: 1953-70	L	Modified	5.87	23	175
		H	Sainte-Laguë			
		LR-Hare		40	1	
Denmark3	12:1971-2000	L	Modified	7.94	17	175
		H	Sainte-Laguë			
		LR-Hare		40	1	
Estonia1	3: 1992-2000	L	Mod. Hare	8.93	11.33	101
		H	d'Hondt	101	1	
Greece1 <sup>51</sup>	1: 1946-49	L	Droop	9.32	38	354
		H <sub>1</sub>			9	
		H <sub>2</sub>	LR-		1	
Greece2	1: 1950	L	Droop	6.62	39	258
		H <sub>1</sub>			9	
		H <sub>2</sub>	LR-		1	
Greece3	1: 1951	L	Hare	6.10	41	250
		H <sub>1</sub>			9	
		H <sub>2</sub>			1	
Greece6	1: 1958-60	L	Hare	5.45	55	300
		H <sub>1</sub>			9	
		H <sub>2</sub>			1	
Greece7	3: 1961-66	L	Droop	5.45	55	300
		H <sub>1</sub>			9	
		H <sub>2</sub>			1	

Table 9: Multi-Tier Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Greece8	3: 1974-84	L	Droop	5.14	56	300
		$H_1$			9	
		$H_2$			1	
Greece9	1: 1985-1988	$H_3$	LR-Hare	12	1	
		L	Droop	5.14	56	300
		$H_1$			9	
Greece10	3: 1989-92	$H_2$			1	
		$H_3$	LR-Hare	12	1	
		L	Droop	5.14	56	300
Greece11	3: 1993-2000	$H_1$	LR-Droop		13	
		$H_2$	LR-Hare	12	1	
		L	Droop	5.14	56	300
Greek Cyprus1	2: 1983-1995	$H_1$	Hare		13	
		$H_2$			1	
		$H_3$	LR-Hare	12	1	
Greek Cyprus2 <sup>52</sup>	1: 1996-2000	L	Hare	9.33	6	56
		H	???	56	1	
		H	???	56	1	
Iceland2	8: 1959-86	L	d'Hondt	6.13	8	60
		H	d'Hondt	11	1	
Iceland3	4: 1987-2000	L	LR-Hare	6.25	8	63
		H	d'Hondt	13	1	
Italy1	2: 1948-52	L	Reinforced Imperiali	18.52	31	574
		H	LR-Hare	574	1	
Italy3	9: 1958-1993	L	Imperiali	19.57	32	626.22
		H	LR-Hare	626.22	1	
Malta2	4: 1987-2000	L	STV	5	13	67
		H	LR-Hare	67	1	
Mauritius1 <sup>53</sup>	7: 1968-2000	L	Plurality	2.95	21	68.29
		H		1	8	
Nicaragua2 <sup>54</sup>	1: 1996-2000	L	Hare	4.12	17	90
		$H_1$	LR-Hare	70	1	
		$H_2$	LR-Hare	20	1	
Norway3 <sup>55</sup>	3: 1989-2000	L	Modified Sainte-Laguë	8.26	19	165
		H	HA-	8	1	
Romania1	4: 1990-2000	L	Hare	8.21	42	342.5
		H	d'Hondt	342.5	1	
Slovak Republic1	1: 1994-97	L	Droop	37.5	4	150
		H	LR-Droop	150	1	
Slovenia1	3: 1992-2000	L	Hare	11	8	88
		H	d'Hondt	88	1	
South Africa1 <sup>56</sup>	2: 1994-2000	L	STV	22.22	9	400
		H	STV	22.22	9	
Sweden3	10:1970-2000	L	Modified Sainte-Laguë	10.99	28.2	349.2
		H	Modified Sainte-Laguë	39.2	1	
Turkey2 <sup>57</sup>	1: 1965-68	L	Hare	6.72	67	450
		H	LR-Hare	450	1	
Venezuela2 <sup>58</sup>	6: 1959-92	L	d'Hondt	7.92	23	198.83
		H		16.67	1	
Unlinked Multi-Tier Systems						
Croatia3 <sup>59</sup>	1: 2000	L	d'Hondt	14	10	151
		$H_1$	d'Hondt	6	1	

Table 9: Multi-Tier Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Ecuador <sup>260</sup>	8: 1979-97	$H_2$	Plurality	1	5	73.75
		L	LR-Hare	3.01	20.5	
El Salvador <sup>261</sup>	4: 1991-2000	H	LR-Hare	12	1	84
		L	LR-Hare	4.57	14	
Guatemala4	1: 1990-93	H	LR-Hare	20	1	116
		L	d'Hondt	3.87	23	
Guatemala5	2: 1994-98	H1	d'Hondt	27	1	80
		L	d'Hondt	2.78	23	
Guatemala6	1: 1999-2000	H1	d'Hondt	16	1	113
		L	d'Hondt	3.96	23	
Papua New Guinea <sup>162</sup>	5: 1977-2000	H	d'Hondt	22	1	109
		L	Plurality	1	89	
Poland1	1: 1991-92	H	Plurality	1	20	460
		L	Hare	10.57	37	
Poland2	2: 1993-2000	H	Modified Sainte-Laguë	69	1	460
		L	d'Hondt	7.52	52	
		H	d'Hondt	69	1	

## Appendix 8: Mixed Electoral Systems

Table 10 illustrates the features of mixed electoral systems. MAJ indicates those seats allocated by the majoritarian formula, while PR indicates those seats allocated by proportional representation.

Table 10: Mixed Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
1. Independent Mixed Systems						
Coexistence Systems						
Greece <sup>563</sup>	1: 1956-57	MAJ MAJ/PR PR	Plurality	2.89 7.04 15.17	9 26 6	300
Iceland <sup>1</sup>	5: 1946-59	MAJ PR PR	Plurality D'Hondt D'Hondt	1 2.86 11	21 7 1	52
Madagascar <sup>2</sup>	1: 1998-2000	MAJ PR	Plurality HA-Hare	1 2	82 39	150
Niger <sup>1</sup>	2: 1993-95	MAJ PR	Plurality LR-Hare	1 9.38	8 8	83
Panama <sup>364</sup>	3: 1989-2000	MAJ PR	Plurality LR-Hare	1 3.47	28 12	69.67
Suriname <sup>165</sup>	1: 1977-79	MAJ PR PR	Plurality LR-Hare LR-Hare	2 3 12	3 7 1	39
Superposition Systems						
Albania <sup>266</sup>	2: 1996-2000	MAJ PR	Abs. Maj. Hare	1 32.5	115 1	147.5
Andorra <sup>1</sup>	2: 1993-2000	MAJ PR	Plurality LR-Hare	2 14	7 1	28
Armenia <sup>167</sup>	1: 1995-1998	MAJ PR	Qual. Maj. LR-Hare	1 40	150 1	190
Armenia <sup>2</sup>	1: 1999-2000	MAJ PR	Plurality LR-Hare	1 56	75 1	131
Bulgaria <sup>1</sup>	1: 1990	MAJ PR	Abs. Maj. d'Hondt	1 7.14	200 28	400
Croatia <sup>168</sup>	1: 1992-94	MAJ PR MAJ PR	Plurality d'Hondt Plurality	1 61 1 13	60 1 4	138
Croatia <sup>2</sup>	1: 1995-1999	MAJ PR PR MAJ	Plurality d'Hondt d'Hondt Plurality	1 80 12 1	28 1 1 7	127
Ecuador <sup>3</sup>	1: 1998-2000	L H	Plurality LR-Hare	5 20	21 1	125
Japan <sup>2</sup>	2: 1996-2000	MAJ PR	Plurality d'Hondt	1 17.27	300 11	490
Kyrgyzstan <sup>2</sup>	1: 2000	MAJ PR	Abs. Maj. LR-Hare	1 15	45 1	60
Lithuania <sup>1</sup>	3: 1992-2000	MAJ PR	Abs. Maj. LR-Hare	1 70	71 1	141

Table 10: Mixed Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Macedonia <sup>2</sup>	1: 1998-2000	MAJ	Abs. Maj.	1	85	120
		PR	d'Hondt	35	1	
Philippines <sup>3</sup> <sup>69</sup>	1: 1998-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	208	260
		PR		52	1	
Russia <sup>1</sup>	3: 1993-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	225	450
		PR	LR-Hare	225	1	
South Korea <sup>2</sup>	2: 1988-1995	MAJ	Plurality	1	246.5	292.5
		PR	LR-Hare	46	1	
South Korea <sup>3</sup> <sup>70</sup>	2: 1996-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	246.5	292.5
		PR	LR-Hare	46	1	
Taiwan <sup>1</sup> <sup>71</sup>	1: 1998-2000	MAJ	SNTV	6.72	25	225
		PR	LR-Hare	41	1	
		MAJ	SNTV	4	2	
		PR	LR-Hare	8	1	
Ukraine <sup>2</sup>	1: 1998-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	225	450
		PR	LR-Hare	225	1	
Fusion Systems						
Turkey <sup>5</sup>	2: 1987-94	MAJ	Plurality	1	105.5	450
		PR	d'Hondt	3.27	105.5	
Sri Lanka <sup>3</sup>	3: 1989-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	22	225
		PR	LR-Hare	7.91	22	
		PR	LR-Hare	29	1	
2. Dependent Mixed Systems						
Correction Systems						
Albania <sup>1</sup>	1: 1992-1995	MAJ	Abs. Maj.	1	100	140
		PR	Hare	40	1	
Bolivia <sup>4</sup> <sup>72</sup>	1: 1997-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	68	130
		PR	d'Hondt	6.89	9	
Germany <sup>1</sup>	3: 1990-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	328	667.67
		PR	LR-Hare	667.67	1	
Hungary <sup>1</sup>	3: 1990-2000	MAJ	Abs. Maj.	1	176	386
		PR	Droop	10.5	20	
		PR	Hare	58	1	
Italy <sup>4</sup> <sup>73</sup>	2: 1994-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	475	630
		PR	LR-Hare	5.96	26	
Mexico <sup>1</sup> <sup>74</sup>	1: 2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	300	500
		PR	LR-Hare	40	5	
New Zealand <sup>2</sup>	2: 1996-2000	MAJ	Plurality	1	65	120
		PR	Sainte-Laguë	55	1	
Venezuela <sup>3</sup> <sup>75</sup>	1: 1993-97	MAJ	Plurality	1	102	203
		PR	d'Hondt	96	23	
		PR		5	1	
Venezuela <sup>4</sup>	1: 1998-99	MAJ	Plurality	1.22	72	207
		PR	d'Hondt	4.21	24	
		PR		18	1	
West Germany <sup>1</sup>	1: 1949-52	MAJ	Plurality	1	241	402
		PR	d'Hondt	36.55	11	
West Germany <sup>2</sup>	1: 1953-56	MAJ	Plurality	1	242	487
		PR	d'Hondt	54.11	9	
West Germany <sup>3</sup>	8: 1957-86	MAJ	Plurality	1	247.75	496.88
		PR	d'Hondt	496.88	1	
West Germany <sup>4</sup>	1: 1987-89	MAJ	Plurality	1	248	497
		PR	LR-Hare	497	1	

Table 10: Mixed Systems, 1946-2000

Electoral System	Number of Elections and Years	Tier	Electoral Formula	District Magnitude	Number of Districts	Assembly Size
Conditional Systems						
France <sup>2</sup>	2: 1951-57	MAJ PR	Conditional Conditional	5.28	103	544
Italy <sup>276</sup>	1: 1953-57	MAJ PR	Conditional LR-Hare	19.03	30	590

## Appendix 9: Data Sources for Election Results

### Articles and Books

Information relating to election results came from Payne et al. (2002); Baxter (2002); Bigelow (1960); Birch (2001); Butwell (1960); Caramani (2000); Castillo (1997); Conaghan (1995); Cook and Paxton (1998); Cox (1997); Crisp (2000); Fairbairn (1957); FLACSO (1995); Fraga (1999); Central Electoral Commission of the Dominican Republic (1970, 1974, 1990, 1995); Gonzalez (1995); Jones and Samuels (2002); Kohin (1964); Leon (1986); Lijphart (1994); Mackie and Rose (1991); Monlinelli, Palanza and Sin (1999); Nicolau (1998); Nohlen (1978, 1993*a*, 1993*b*); Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001*b*, 2001*a*); Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999); Ozbudun (2000); Perez (1986); Saez (1998); Silverstein (1952); Solsten (1993); Ulloa (1999); Venezuelan Electoral Commission (1963). Various issues of *West European Politics*, *Electoral Studies*, the *European Journal of Political Research*, *Boletin Latinoamerica*, the *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections*, and the *Political Handbook of the World* were also used.

### Personal Correspondence

Jonathan Hartlyn, Mark Jones, Helga Fleischhacker, Brian Crisp.

### Internet Sites

Elections Around the World (Wilfred Derksen); Election Resources on the Internet (Manuel Álvarez-Rivera's); Election Archives (Adam Carr); Political Database of the Americas (University of Georgetown); Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (University of Essex); NCSEER Post-Communist Elections Project Home Page (Princeton University); Electoral Institute of Southern Africa; Elections and Electoral Systems Around the World (University of Keele); Parties and Elections in Europe; International Foundation for Election Systems. Costa Rican Electoral Commission; Peruvian Government, San Marino Electoral Commission, Slovenian Electoral Commission, Federal Election Commission, Zambian Electoral Commission, Australian Parliament, Canadian Parliament, Indian Electoral Commission, Israeli Parliament, Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat.

## Appendix 10: Data Sources for Electoral Institutions

### Articles and Books

Ahmad (1970); Amorim Neto and Cox (Amorim Neto & Cox 1997); Ballivian (1993); Baxter (2002); Bigelow (1960); Birch (2001); Butwell (1960); Canton (1973); CAPEL (various years); Caramani (2000); Clogg (1987); Coke (1952); Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1992, 2000); Contreras (1986); Cook (1998); Corporación de Estudios Regionales Guayaquil (1986); Cox (1997); Crisp (2000); Consejo Supremo Electoral Nicaragua (1996); Degboe (1995); Delury (1999); Dominican Junta Central Electoral (1970, 1974, 1990, 1995); Dominguez (1978); Elklit (1996, forthcoming); Fairbairn (1957); FLACSO (1995); Fraga (1999); Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington D.C. (1996); Grofman and Lijphart (1994); Guatemalan Inforpress Centroamericana (1995); Hegarty (1983); Hicken and Kasuya (2003); Hsieh (1996); Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems (ICSPS 1964); Inter Parliamentary Union's *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Development*; Jones (1995, 1997, 2002); Kahin (1959); Kaminski (2002); Kasapovic (1996); Keesing's Record of World Events (Keesing's Contemporary Archives); Kohin (1964); Koichi (1988); Le Monde (1986, 1993, 1997); Leon (1986); Lijphart (1994); Mackie and Rose (1991); Maiz (1997); Massicote and Blais (1999); McDonald (1989); Moncion (1986); Monlinelli, Palanza and Sin (1999); Morriss (1999); Mozaffar (2001); Nicolau (1998); Nohlen (1978, 1993a, 1993b); Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann (2001b, 2001a); Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999); Ozbudun (2000); Pasquino (1966); Payne et al. (2002); Penniman (1978); Perez (1986); Przeworski, et al. (1996, 2000); Rose (2000); Saez (1998); Shugart (1992); Shugart and Wattenberg (2001); Solsten (1993); Shvetsova (1999); Siaroff (2000); Siber (1997); Silverstein (1952); Ulloa (1999); Urzua Valenzuela (1992); Vergelis (1981); Zalduendo (1958).

### Personal Correspondence

Sarah Birch (University of Essex); André Blais (University of Montreal); Michael Coppedge (University of Notre Dame); Brian Crisp (University of Arizona); Jorgen Elklit; Helga Fleischhacker (Institut für Politikwissenschaft, University of Mainz, Germany); Miriam Golden (UCLA); Christof Hartmann (Ruhr University, Bochum); Patricio Navia (New York University); Alberto Penades (University of Salamanca, Spain); Joshua Tucker (Princeton University); Austrian Interior Ministry; Bangladeshi Parliament Secretariat; Danish Interior Ministry; Norwegian Parliamentary Library; STATEC Luxembourg; Statistics Iceland; Swiss Federal Statistical Office: Culture, Politics and Living Conditions Section.

### General Internet Sites

Elections Around the World (Wilfred Derksen); Election Resources on the Internet (Manuel Álvarez-Rivera's); Election Archives (Adam Carr); Political Database of the Americas (University of Georgetown); Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (University of Essex); NCSEER Post-Communist Elections Project Home Page (Princeton University); Electoral Institute of Southern Africa; Elections and Electoral Systems Around the World (University of Keele); Parties and Elections in Europe; Constitutions: Treaties and Declarations (University of Keele); International Foundation for Election Systems; University of Würzburg's website on constitutions; Virtual Finland; Political Reference Almanac; CIA World Factbook.

## More Specific Internet Sites

Albanian Parliament; Andorran Government; Australian Electoral Commission, Australian Parliamentary Library; Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia; Costa Rican Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones; Election Commission of India; Elections Ireland; Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the USA and Canada; Finnish National Statistics Office; German National Statistics Office; Greek Ministry of the Interior; Government of Mauritius; Guatemalan Tribunal Supremo Electoral; Hellenic Resources Net; Israeli Parliament; Junta Central Electoral Republica Dominicana; Lijphart Election Archive; Libanvote; Luxembourg's Service, Information et Presse, Ministère d'État; Maltese Government; Official Site of the Republic of Cyprus; Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe; Peruvian Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales; Portuguese Parliament; President of Iceland; President of Uruguay; Republic of Slovenia; San Marino's Electoral Commission; Slovenian Constitutional Court; Spanish Senate; Sri Lankan Department of Census and Statistics; Sri Lankan Department of Information; Statistics Norway; Swedish Social Science Data Services; Swiss Statistics Office; Tribunal Electoral de Panama; Turkish Embassy in Washington D.C.; United Nations in Indonesia; University of Iceland; University of Western Australia; Unwembi's Resource of South African Government Information; US Federal Election Commission; Vrije Universiteit Brussels.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>There have been legislative seats reserved for women since 1972 in Bangladesh. The women to fill these seats are chosen by the directly-elected representatives. Those parties winning an absolute majority of seats in legislative elections are almost automatically assured of gaining all of the reserved seats. Since 1991 no party has been able to win an absolute majority. As a result, these seats have been shared between the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Jammāt-I-Islami Bangladesh party (JIB) and the Jatiya Party (JY) (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*, Hicken & Kasuya 2003).

<sup>2</sup>The 1991 constitution allowed for the establishment of up to five additional seats to represent ethnic groups, political minorities and Colombians residing overseas (Jones 1995). Prior to the 1994 election, a two-member district at the national level was created for Colombia's black communities (Jones 1997).

<sup>3</sup>Ten legislative members are indirectly elected by the ten Regional Councils and two are indirectly elected by the National Congress of Local Democratic Organizations.

<sup>4</sup>In 1985 there was a second compensatory tier that allocated six seats (Jones 1995, Jones 1997).

<sup>5</sup>The president may nominate up to two members of the Anglo-Indian community if they seem to be under-represented (Hicken & Kasuya 2003, Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*).

<sup>6</sup>38 seats are reserved for the military (Hicken & Kasuya 2003).

<sup>7</sup>The Attorney-General is an ex-officio member of parliament. Parliament also appoints a representative from the Banaban community on Rabi Island in Fiji (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>8</sup>Thirteen additional seats are elected by Malians residing overseas (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999).

<sup>9</sup>There are fourteen senators in the legislature. Four senators serve a full term of four years, while the other ten come up for reelection every two years. Thus, there are legislative elections every two years (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>10</sup>The president appointed six additional members to the parliament in 1998 (<http://electionworld.org/namibia.htm>).

<sup>11</sup>If an unsuccessful presidential candidate wins a percentage of the national vote equal to or greater than the average of the quotas in the nation's nine legislative electoral districts, they are given a seat in the legislature. There were six such seats in 1984, and two in 1990 (Jones 1995).

<sup>12</sup>Pakistan has often reserved seats for women and minorities. For example, the 1962 constitution reserved six seats for women. The number of seats reserved for women was raised to ten after the 1977 election and to twenty in 1985. Seats were no longer reserved for women after 1988. Since 1975, when the Pakistani electorate was divided into non-Muslim and Muslim voters, a fixed number of seats has been allocated to minorities. Non-muslims were divided into (i) Christians, (ii) Hindus and outcastes, (iii) the Sikh, Buddhist and Parsi community, and (iv) Ahmadis. These minorities have been guaranteed 10 seats since 1985. Christians and

Hindus use plurality rule to elect four representatives each, while the Sikhs and Ahmadis use plurality rule to elect one representative each (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*, Hicken & Kasuya 2003).

<sup>13</sup>There are two two-member districts for the Portuguese living abroad. One is for those in Europe and one for those in non-European countries (Rose 2000).

<sup>14</sup>Twelve seats are reserved for 'paramount chiefs' elected separately through a restricted franchise (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999).

<sup>15</sup>Two seats are allocated to minorities (Shvetsova 1999, Birch 2001).

<sup>16</sup>The governor appointed six seats 1946-70 (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>17</sup>The indirectly elected seats include six for army representatives, three for trade unions, five from youth organizations, and five from organizations for the disabled. Delegates from the 39 districts of Uganda each also elect one female representative to parliament (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999).

<sup>18</sup>A candidate had to win a plurality of the votes and 25% of the vote in at least 2/3 of the states to become president in the 1979 and 1999 elections. If only two candidates contested these elections, then the winning candidate had to have a majority of the votes in more than half of the states for the 1979 elections (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999) and not less than 25% of the vote in at least 2/3 of the states in the 1999 elections (1999 Nigerian Constitution). If no candidate met these conditions in 1979, then an electoral college comprising the national and state legislative bodies chose the president. If these conditions were not met in 1999, the Independent National Electoral Commission would choose two candidates to have a runoff election by majority rule.

<sup>19</sup>For the 1995 and 1999 presidential elections, a candidate is declared president if he/she wins 45% of the valid votes. A candidate may also be declared president if he/she wins 40% of the valid votes and this candidate wins 10% more of the valid votes than the next best-placed candidate. If these conditions are not met, then there is a runoff election. If more than two candidates overcome the threshold, then the one with the most votes wins (Article 98 of the Argentinian Constitution).

<sup>20</sup>If no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round of popular elections, then the president is chosen in a joint session of the bicameral legislature from among the top three candidates prior to 1994 and from among the top two candidates since 1994 (Jones 1995, Jones 1997, Jones 2002, Payne et al. 2002).

<sup>21</sup>Between 1946 and 1972 a candidate was elected president if he/she won an absolute majority in the first round of popular elections. If this did not occur, then the president was chosen in a joint session of the bicameral legislature from among the top two candidates (Jones 1995).

<sup>22</sup>A candidate needs to win over 40% of the vote since 1949 to be elected president. If this does not occur, then there is a runoff between the top two candidates (Jones 1995, Rose 2000). If two candidates overcome the threshold, then the one with the most votes wins (Article 138 of the Costa Rican Constitution).

<sup>23</sup>Since 1998 a candidate needs to win 50% of the vote plus one or 45% of the vote and at least 10% more than his nearest rival (Payne et al. 2002).

<sup>24</sup>If no candidate received an absolute majority of the vote in the first round of popular elections between 1946 and 1981, then Congress chooses the president (Nohlen 1993*a*).

<sup>25</sup>In the 1996 presidential election, a candidate had to win at least 45% of the valid vote to avoid a runoff (Jones 1997). Since 1999 this threshold has been reduced to 40% or 35% and a 5% advantage over the nearest competitor (Payne et al. 2002). If two candidates overcome the threshold, then the one with the most votes wins (Article 147 of the Nicaraguan Constitution).

<sup>26</sup>During periods of qualified majority rule the candidate with the most votes won provided that he/she won at least one-third of the vote. If this threshold was not passed, then the Chamber and Senate met to choose among the top three candidates. This only happened in the 1962 elections. For the 1980 elections, a candidate had to receive more than 36% of the vote to avoid a runoff in Congress. An absolute majority was required in 1985 (Jones 1995, Nohlen 1993*a*).

<sup>27</sup>No candidate is elected president unless he/she wins more than 55% of the votes cast. If no candidate achieves this threshold, then there is a runoff between the top two candidates from the first round (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999).

<sup>28</sup>If no candidate wins an absolute majority of the electoral college vote, the names of the top three candidates are submitted to the House of Representatives, where each state casts one vote under rules established by the House.

<sup>29</sup>There was a presidential election in March 1960. Syngman Rhee reportedly won with 100% of the vote. However, this election was annulled. A president was indirectly elected in August 1960 by both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>30</sup>There are direct presidential elections in Kiribati. The president is elected by plurality rule from a minimum of three and a maximum of four candidates nominated by the legislative representatives in the first sitting following a general election (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>31</sup>In 1988 the president was elected partly by direct popular vote and partly by an electoral college. If one of the candidates had received a majority of the votes cast, then he/she would have been elected. However, none did and the members of the electoral college who were elected on the same ballot chose the president. Since 1994, presidents have been elected by a direct popular vote using an absolute majority system (Torneblum 2002).

<sup>32</sup>For the presidential elections between 1946 and 1987, an absolute majority system was used within an electoral college (Mackie & Rose 1991).

<sup>33</sup>Argentina has many electoral systems because democratic periods have frequently been interrupted by military coups. Each time a democratic period is reinstated the whole legislature must be replaced in a single election. After this, half of the legislative seats are reelected each election. This means that the average magnitude is significantly lower from the second election on for each democratic period. The whole lower house has been elected six times (1946, 1951, 1958, 1963, 1973, 1983). All of the other elections have only involved reelecting half of the deputies (Monlinelli, Palanza & Sin 1999, Jones 1995).

<sup>34</sup>Between 1947 and 1974 Lebanon used a majoritarian electoral system (either absolute majority, qualified majority, or plurality) in which religious sects (Muslims and Christians) were allocated a fixed quota of seats (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>35</sup>Ten legislative members are elected for a two year term, while the other four are elected for a four year term (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>36</sup>Winning 40% of the vote was sufficient to avoid a second round of elections (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*).

<sup>37</sup>If the candidate with the largest electoral support does not win more than 25% of the valid vote in a particular constituency, then there is a runoff between the top two candidates (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*).

<sup>38</sup>All remainder seats were allocated to the party which won the plurality of the vote in the district (Jones 1995).

<sup>39</sup>Although elections were held in this period, they were ultimately meaningless for determining who won office. This was because there was a constitutional agreement among the main parties to alternate in office and share legislative seats (Nohlen 1993*a*).

<sup>40</sup>The Droop formula is used in districts in which two deputies are elected (Jones 1995, Shugart 1992).

<sup>41</sup>A second compensatory tier was added for the elections in 1985. The number of seats allocated in this tier were not fixed; six were actually distributed in this election (Jones 1995, Jones 1997).

<sup>42</sup>Parties must win at least 8% nationwide to win seats (<http://www.ipu.org>).

<sup>43</sup>In the single two-seat district and the single three-seat district the Droop quota is used. All remainder seats are allocated one at a time in descending order to the parties that received the largest number of votes in the district (Jones 1995).

<sup>44</sup>Peru is confusing – Nohlen says it is Hare until 1992 when it switches to D’Hondt. However, Jones (1995) says that Peru has used d’Hondt since 1963.

<sup>45</sup>The d’Hondt system in Israel is referred to as the Bader-Ofer system after Yohanan Bader and Avraham Ofer who proposed it. Between 1996 and 2001 the Prime Minister was directly elected using an absolute majority electoral system (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*). As a result, Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) argue that the Israeli system should be seen as a mixed system with two tiers during this period. However, this does not meet the 5% criterion that I outline later when dealing with mixed systems.

<sup>46</sup>One single member district uses plurality rule (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*).

<sup>47</sup>Seats are allocated in a three-stage process, with the ultimate tier the nation as a whole. Although there are three tiers, the framework is functionally equivalent to the use of a single national district using d’Hondt (Nohlen 1993*a*, Jones 1995). As a result, I classify the Uruguayan systems with the other highest average single-tiered systems.

<sup>48</sup>Seats are allocated in 43 regional districts using the Hare quota in the first tier. These seats are then subtracted from the number of seats allotted in the second tier allocation. Remaining seats are allocated in the third tier using the d’Hondt formula (Caramani 2000). For example, 97 seats were allocated in the first tier, 63 in the second tier, and 23 in the third tier in the 1995 Austrian elections (Correspondence with the Austrian Interior Ministry).

<sup>49</sup>The distribution of seats is carried out at two levels: arrondissements and the provinces.

Seats are distributed at the provincial level if two or more party lists from different arrondissements make a joint official declaration of *apparentement*. *Apparentement* is when parties link their lists to form cartels. The lists of the different parties making up the cartel still appear separately on the ballot and voters vote for only one of the lists. However, the allocation of seats occurs as if the lists composing the cartel were a single list. This allocation occurs at the provincial level in Belgium by the Hare quota with largest remainders. Seats for parties that do not declare an *apparentement* are distributed at the *arrondissement* level according to d'Hondt (Caramani 2000). Lijphart (1994), Cox (1997) and Rose (2000) differ in their description of the Belgian system since they argue that the Hare quota with largest remainders is used at the *arrondissement* level, while d'Hondt is used at the provincial level.

<sup>50</sup>A new electoral system was introduced in 1981. Seats are distributed at the district level using the Hare quota. Parties that receive less than 10% of the total votes (8% if one of their candidates is elected) cannot participate in the second tier. The electoral quota in the second tier is calculated by dividing the sum of the unused votes of those parties making it to the second tier by the total number of seats remaining. Seats are then allocated to parties for the districts in which they polled best (Delury 1999).

<sup>51</sup>The post-war period has been dominated by a 'reinforced proportional representation' system. In the first tier, seats are allocated using a quota system. Remaining seats then get allocated in a nine district second tier, where in most cases only certain parties can participate (Vergelis 1981). Within each of these districts, the total number of remaining seats is divided by the total number of votes cast for the eligible parties to obtain an electoral quota. This quota is then divided into each eligible party's vote total to see how many remaining seats they are allotted. The assignment of seats actually occurs in the electoral constituencies. Seats unallocated in the second tier now go to a third tier. This time the total vote for the eligible parties in the whole nation is divided by the number of seats remaining to produce a new electoral quota. This system essentially remained in place until 1992 with the exception of the 1952 and 1956 elections. Thresholds for participation in the second tier were removed in 1985 and only two tiers were used for the three elections between 1989 and 1990. The quota used in the electoral district is typically the Droop quota, although the Hare quota was used for the 1951 and 1958 elections. The 1974 election introduced a fourth tier in which 12 separate 'state deputies' are elected in a single national constituency using some variant of the Hare formula. They are typically elected using the Hare quota with largest remainders. The allocation of seats in the third tier changed slightly with the 1993 election. For more information on this and other aspects of the Greek electoral system, see Caramani (2000), Clogg (1987) and Vergelis (1981). Lijphart (1994) argues that although quota-based proportional representation systems were employed, the whole Greek system (1974-89 at least) should be characterized as using d'Hondt.

<sup>52</sup>In order to participate in the second tier, a party or coalition must have either won at least one seat in any constituency, or at least 1.8% of the vote nationwide for single parties, 10% for coalitions of two parties and 20% for larger coalitions. The quota applied in the second tier is calculated by dividing the total number of unused votes of the parties participating in the second tier by the number of remaining seats. Single parties need at least 3.6% of the national vote to actually win a seat in the second tier (Rose 2000, Birch 2001).

<sup>53</sup>Up to 8 seats are allocated to 'best-loser' candidates to ensure a fair representation of each community. The first four best-loser seats are allocated to the most under-represented communities irrespective of party affiliation. The second four best-loser seats are awarded on a party and community basis (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999). While the goal of these additional seats is to ensure increased proportionality, the formula for allocating them remains essentially majoritarian. As a result, I classify the electoral system in Mauritius as multi-tier rather than mixed.

<sup>54</sup>One ballot is used for the electoral district and the first higher tier, while a second ballot

is used for the second higher tier. In districts that elect one or two deputies, the Droop quota is used. If one or both seats are not allocated because parties fail to obtain a full quota, then the plurality party receives the seat in the single-member district and the two largest parties receive the seats in the binomial district. All remainder seats from the districts that elect three or more deputies are allocated at the first higher tier. Those parties whose vote total is equal to or greater than the average quota of the nation's four electoral regions are eligible to receive remainder seats in the second higher tier (Jones 1997, Payne et al. 2002).

<sup>55</sup>Eight seats are allocated nationally on the basis of the highest averages remaining after the allocation of constituency seats. Only parties receiving at least 4% of the national vote are eligible to win these national seats (Caramani 2000).

<sup>56</sup>In South Africa, 200 seats are distributed in nine constituencies using the STV-Droop quota with largest remainders. The total number of seats for each party is calculated proportionately on the basis of the votes cast for each party nationally using the STV-Droop quota. Constituency seats are subtracted from those won at the national level. The difference is filled by the national or regional party list (Nohlen, Krennerich & Thibaut 1999).

<sup>57</sup>In the lower tier there is one single member constituency that employs plurality rule. The four two-member districts use the Droop quota, while the other 62 multi-member districts use the Hare quota. Remainder seats are allocated at the national level using the Hare system with largest remainders (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001a).

<sup>58</sup>The size of the Venezuelan assembly is not fixed. There are a fixed number of seats allocated in electoral districts by d'Hondt. However, each party's voteshare is divided by a national quota which is calculated as one divided by the fixed number of seats. Each party that is 'shortchanged' by the district-level allocations then receives additional seats for each quota that it makes (Shugart 1992, Crisp 2000). There are limitations on the number of additional seats available per party. For example, a limit of six seats was applied in 1959, four seats in 1970 and five seats in 1980 (Nohlen 1993a). The number of additional seats awarded at each election is not fixed. For example, it was 11 in 1963 (CSE 1963) and 16 in 1978 (Penniman 1978).

<sup>59</sup>Croatia introduced a new electoral system in 2000. Five seats were allocated in a higher tier to ethnic minorities using plurality rule. The Serb minority was now only allocated a single seat. Although there was a constituency for the Croatian diaspora, no fixed number of seats was automatically allocated to it in 2000. The seats allotted to this district were determined by the turnout in this district relative to turnout in the other constituencies (CSCE 2000).

<sup>60</sup>The electoral tiers are unconnected (Massicotte & Blais 1999, Shugart 1992). The d'Hondt formula is used in districts in which two deputies are elected (Jones 1997). The d'Hondt formula in a two seat district essentially produces the same results as plurality rule where the first seat is given to the largest party and the second seat to the next largest party (so long as the first party did not have 50% more votes than the second party). Due to this, Massicotte and Blais (1999) classify Ecuador as a mixed system since 1978. I do not do so here since the 'plurality characteristics' are simply an artifact of district magnitude.

<sup>61</sup>Although El Salvador uses a single ballot, Jones (1995) reports that the higher tier is separate and not compensatory. As a result, it is classified as an unconnected multi-tier system.

<sup>62</sup>Most scholars categorize Papua New Guinea as having a single tier plurality system. However, there are three types of legislative members. 89 members are elected using plurality rule from local constituencies, while a further 20 are elected using plurality rule in provincial constituencies. Thus, voters cast a vote for a local candidate and another for a provincial

candidate. Up to three further members may be nominated to office with the support of 2/3 of the parliament. However, no member has been nominated in this way so far (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*a*, Hicken & Kasuya 2003).

<sup>63</sup>Plurality rule was applied in nine of the 41 departments in which 2-3 seats were returned (26 seats). In districts returning 4-10 seats, a mixture of plurality and proportional representation was used (183 seats). For example, the runner-up list receives one seat (in 4-6 seat districts), two seats (in 7-9 seat districts), or three seats (in 10 seat districts) so long as it wins at least 15% of the vote in the district and the nation. The leading list receives all of the remaining seats. In districts returning more than 11 seats, leading lists get all of the seats if the runner-up list gets less than 15% (91 seats). If not, proportional representation applies between the leading and runner-up list (Massicotte & Blais 1999, Caramani 2000).

<sup>64</sup>There is some confusion as to the number of seats allocated by plurality rule in single member districts and the number allocated by proportional representation in the other districts. Massicotte and Blais (1999), Nohlen (1993*a*) and Jones (1995) all offer slightly different figures. Averages cited below for the size of the assembly are based on 67 seats in the 1989 election and 71 seats in subsequent elections. Other figures are based on 28 single-member districts in all elections since 1989 and 12 proportional representation districts. Remainder seats from the proportional representation districts are allocated in two stages. First, seats are allocated to parties which receive half of the Hare quota, but which did not possess a full quota. If remaining seats exist, then they are allocated using the LR-Hare formula, but from a vote base calculated by subtracting half a quota from each party's vote for every seat already won. A party which won 3% of the valid vote at the national level (5% since 1994) without winning any legislative seats receives a single compensatory seat (Jones 1995, Jones 1997).

<sup>65</sup>This electoral system is rarely classified as a coexistence mixed system. However, Jones (1995) notes that there were three districts each electing two deputies by plurality rule. Thus, more than 5% of the assembly were elected by a majoritarian formula, while the rest were elected by a proportional formula. Thus, it qualifies as a coexistence mixed system.

<sup>66</sup>The strongest party receives the unallocated seats in the PR districts (Massicotte & Blais 1999).

<sup>67</sup>If no candidate wins at least 25% of the vote in the first round, then the top two candidates compete in a runoff (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001*b*).

<sup>68</sup>Originally, 124 seats were to be elected in Croatia in 1992 (Siber 1997). Sixty seats were allocated using plurality rule in single-member districts. A further four seats were allocated by plurality rule in four separate districts to minorities that comprised less than 8% of the total population (Italians, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, and Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Germans, Austrians). A further 60 seats were elected using the d'Hondt formula in a single district. This gives a total of 124 seats. However, the Croatian constitution requires that minorities accounting for less than 8% of the population be given five seats in parliament. Thus, an additional minority deputy was elected off the party list section of the electoral system. The constitution also requires that minorities that account for more than 8% of the total population (only Serbs) be given a number of seats proportional to their size in the population. Thus, an additional 13 seats were given to the Serb minority, bringing the total number of seats in the parliament to 138 (CSCE 1992). In the 1995 elections, 12 seats were reserved for the croatian diaspora in a single upper tier district, while seven seats were elected by plurality rule in special districts for ethnic minorities. There were three seats for Serbs, 1 for Italians, 1 for Hungarians, 1 for Czechs and Slovaks, and 1 for Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Austrians (Kasapovic 1996).

<sup>69</sup>Up to 52 seats are allocated according to proportional representation in a national tier. The five largest parties from the previous election are not entitled to compete for these seats.

A party or sectoral organization obtains a seat for every 2% of the total valid votes that it wins in this tier, with a maximum of three seats available for each party. In 1998, 122 sectoral organizations and coalitions ran in the national tier, only ten of which overcame the 2% threshold. Thus, only 14 of the possible 52 seats were filled (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001a). While Massicotte and Blais (1999) classify this system as correctional, Hicken and Kasuya (2003) clearly note that there is no linkage between the two tiers in terms of votes or seats. Massicotte and Blais would be correct if the five largest parties from the current election were not entitled to compete for the second tier seats. However, it is the five largest parties from the previous election.

<sup>70</sup>The largest party no longer won bonus seats in the upper tier. Instead, all upper tier seats were allocated using the Hare system with largest remainders (Rose 2000). Although these upper tier seats in this electoral system should now be considered as compensatory in nature, there is no linkage between the tiers (Hicken & Kasuya 2003). Thus, this electoral system is classified as independent and mixed.

<sup>71</sup>Among the 168 seats allocated at the district level, there are a certain number of seats reserved for representatives of women's organizations. There are three further tiers above the district level. In the first national tier, 41 seats are allocated using the Hare-Niemeyer system. In the second national tier, there are two special districts of four seats each reserved for the aborigine minorities. These seats are allocated according to the single non-transferable vote. Finally, there is a single constituency for the overseas Chinese that elects 8 legislative members according to the Hare-Niemeyer formula (Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann 2001a).

<sup>72</sup>Although two separate ballots are used in this electoral system, the upper tier is the important one for seat allocation (Jones 1997). As a result, I follow Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) in classifying this as a dependent mixed system. Voters have a single fused vote for their legislative members, president and senators in the higher tier. There is some confusion as to the electoral formula applied in the higher tier, with Massicotte and Blais claiming that it is d'Hondt.

<sup>73</sup>While there is no linkage between the seats allocated in the lower and higher tiers, votes are linked across tiers. Seats in the upper tier are distributed on the basis of votes for defeated candidates only, rather than on the basis of all votes cast (Bartolini 2002). Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) emphasize that the seat allocation is not linked and prefer to classify the Italian system as mixed with partial compensation.

<sup>74</sup>Mexico is treated as a dependent correction mixed system because it imposes a cap on over-representation (8% over a party's vote share) (Shugart & Wattenberg 2001, Payne et al. 2002) and because no party may receive more than 63% or 315 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Jones 1995). However, Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) prefer to classify Mexico as an independent (or parallel) mixed system because seat allocation is not connected across tiers and because votes are not strongly connected either.

<sup>75</sup>Five additional seats were allocated using the national electoral quota in the 1993 election (Jones 1995, Jones 1997) and 18 in the 1998 election (Rose 2000).

<sup>76</sup>The Legge Scelba, passed in 1953, stated that if one list (or group of lists) received an absolute majority of the votes, then it would receive 380 of the 590 seats. If no list gained an absolute majority, as was the case in 1953, the electoral system used in 1948 was applied (Caramani 2000, Massicotte & Blais 1999).

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