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Fiscal Policy and the Democratic Process in the European Union

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ABSTRACT

The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union.

KEY WORDS
- electoral system
- European Monetary Union
- fiscal policy
- partisan politics
Introduction

Does the construction of a monetary union with a single currency damage democracy in the European Union? Increasing European financial integration certainly raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups with different ideological programs compete for political power.1 There is a long tradition in political science that parties of the Left and Right offer voters a choice between different macroeconomic policies. Hibbs (1977) argued that governments of the Left run larger budget deficits and are more expansionary than governments of the Right. Cameron (1978) presented evidence that the size of the public sector is a function of partisan orientation. Most of the subsequent research on welfare policy also found some connection between government spending or revenue collection and the ideological composition of governments. Noticeable differences in macroeconomic policy are predicted by much of the formal theoretical literature as well, although the magnitude of these differences is typically smaller than that posited in the informal literature.

Powell (2000) argues that elections are a crucial element of democracy in that they provide a mechanism for voters’ preferences to be reflected in the composition of government and the actions governments take. He analyzes the effect of electoral institutions on the congruence between voter and government preferences. We extend this analysis to the question of the policies governments implement. Conventional wisdom suggests that the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the implementation of the convergence criteria now constrain governments of different partisan hues to follow similar macroeconomic policies. As a result, the democratic process is challenged because political parties are no longer able to offer their electorate a significant choice on fiscal or monetary performance (Paulson, 1997). Traditionally, scholars have focused on how EMU increases the democratic deficit with respect to monetary policy. This is because the European Central Bank (ECB), which is responsible for monetary policy in the euro zone, is unaccountable to both national and European political institutions (Verdun, 1998; Gormley and de Haan, 1996). The unaccountability of the ECB is enshrined in Article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty (Paulson, 1997; Teivainen, 1997). However, EMU also potentially threatens the democratic process with respect to fiscal policy, despite the fact that the instruments of fiscal policy remain primarily in the hands of national governments (Verdun, 1998: 109). Consider the 1997 legislative elections in France. A right-wing government was voted out of office owing to the austere economic measures it had introduced to comply with Maastricht’s debt criteria. The French electorate clearly expressed its support for the Socialist Party and its declared commitment to
job creation. The problem is that governments of the Left are now equally constrained to follow the Maastricht convergence criteria. No matter how large the mandate for change, the Left remains as bound by the requirements of EMU as was the Right.

Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns for the democratic process might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. In fact, most recent studies find that partisan differences in macroeconomic policy and performance have always been the exception rather than the rule. Garrett (1998) finds that systematic evidence for partisan differences in macroeconomic outcomes and a host of fiscal policy instruments is mixed at best. Clark (forthcoming) replicates this finding and argues that there is little evidence of partisan differences in fiscal or monetary policy even after controlling for the modifying effects of exchange rate regimes. Clark and Hallerberg (2000) find little or no systematic relationship between partisan orientation and government debt. These results do not indicate that partisan macroeconomic policies have disappeared recently as a result of European financial integration and monetary union; they suggest that they never existed in the first place.

Clark (forthcoming) argues that the absence of partisan effects on macroeconomic policy is due to the fact that the environment in which incumbents operate encourages convergence in the policies they adopt. He believes that policy convergence may occur because of behavior predicted by the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957). However, it is problematic to use this theorem to explain partisan convergence across a broad sample of European Union countries because most of the formal literature on electoral competition fails to locate convergence equilibria beyond the familiar case of two-party plurality rule. Although it is true that electoral competition may induce convergence in a small number of European Union countries, theory indicates that policy divergence should be expected in a wide range of institutional settings that are common across Europe. None of the recent empirical studies of the partisan model take into account the constraints on partisan politics posed by the electoral system. As a result, their failure to find systematic evidence of partisan effects on macroeconomic policy prior to the 1990s may be the result of inappropriately lumping together observations where policy divergence is expected with cases where it is not. We are not claiming that greater ideological divergence drives fiscal policy. Our contention is simply that empirical analyses have failed to test the partisan hypothesis in those situations most likely to support its predictions. Until this is done, it would be wrong to dismiss the partisan hypothesis.

In this paper, we summarize the formal literature on spatial competition
and focus on those aspects of electoral systems that encourage or discourage policy divergence. We then test implications from this discussion using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. If we find evidence of partisan effects on fiscal policy, then we should be concerned that the Maastricht Treaty has harmed the democratic process by making it difficult for political parties to offer clear and distinct choices on fiscal policy to their voters. It would be wrong to think that the concerns for the democratic process will be assuaged if we find that the partisan composition of governments has no effect in this period; it just means that we need to look beyond increased European financial integration and monetary union for the source of macroeconomic policy convergence.

After a brief overview of the main theoretical and empirical findings in the partisan literature, we analyze the impact that electoral systems have on the spatial position of political parties. We generate hypotheses about the types of electoral system under which we would expect to see partisan differences in macroeconomic policy. We then describe the interaction model that we use to test these hypotheses. Next, the results of the model are discussed. We conclude with suggestions for areas of further research.

The partisan literature

The partisan model is a set of loosely connected assumptions about the ways in which the goals of voters and policy-makers interact with the structural environment to produce partisan differences in policies and/or macroeconomic outcomes. Partisan differences are typically thought to result from divergent policy concerns among political parties. These concerns can stem from intrinsic preferences over macroeconomic outcomes or from the recognition that political survival depends on pleasing distinctive constituencies. The central question addressed by the partisan literature has not changed since the foundational work of Hibbs (1977): where and when do partisan differences exist? Three branches of partisan research can be distinguished:

1. The Hibbsian or pluralist approach examines the direct and unconditional effect of a government’s ideological orientation on macroeconomic policy and outcomes.
2. The social democratic corporatist approach argues that the incentives for, and the effectiveness of, partisan policies depend on the strength and centralization of labor market institutions.
3. The open economy partisan approach analyzes the interaction between
partisan behavior and the degree to which a nation’s goods and capital markets are integrated with the international economy.

Conclusive evidence of partisan differences has proven difficult to find despite numerous empirical studies and various research designs. Hibbs (1977) argued that advanced democratic states comprise distinctive constituencies that differ in their assessment of macroeconomic outcomes and that these differences are reflected in the platforms and behavior of parties that arose to represent them. As a result, ‘working-class based Socialist and Labor parties typically attach far greater importance to full employment than to inflation, whereas business oriented, upper middle-class based Conservative parties generally assign higher priority to price stability than to unemployment’ (1977: 1470). Thus, one should expect parties of the Left to produce consistently higher levels of output and inflation, as well as lower levels of unemployment, than parties of the Right.

Many analysts have inferred that the representation of these different constituencies will also lead to systematic differences in fiscal policies (Cameron, 1978). Specifically, they argue that left governments will be more aggressive in the taxation of capital, more reliant upon progressive income taxes (Garrett, 1998), and quicker to expand social welfare programs along with other mechanisms that redistribute wealth (Stephens, 1979; Castles and McKinley, 1979; Hicks and Swank, 1984). Left-wing governments are also expected to exhibit a greater enthusiasm for counter-cyclical demand management (Huber et al., 1993). The notion that left governments will be more willing to raise taxes than those of the Right stems from the assumption that their constituency will be net recipients of government services and, therefore, less resistant to the tax increases that fund them. The Left’s pursuit of expansionary policies and generous welfare provisions is expected to lead to a propensity for deficit spending (Hahm, 1996; Hahm et al., 1996), with public indebtedness increasing over time (Cameron, 1978).

For two decades, scholars have been attempting to establish an empirical relationship between the ideological orientation of government and various aspects of fiscal policy. However, the evidence from studies looking for partisan differences in the propensity to raise taxes, those focusing on spending behavior, and those emphasizing overall fiscal stance is mixed at best. Although there is some support for the notion that smaller shares of national income are extracted as revenues when right parties are influential (Cameron, 1978; Huber et al., 1993), the evidence related to specific tax policies does not support the partisan model (Swank, 1992). Contrary to the partisan hypothesis, center and left parties are more reluctant to tax capital than are parties of the Right and there is conflicting evidence about the relationship...
between partisanship and personal income taxes (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998).

The picture is similar with respect to studies on spending. The early cross-sectional work tends to confirm the hypothesis that parties of the Left have a tendency to spend more than parties of the Right (Castles, 1982; Hicks and Swank, 1984; Swank, 1988; Comiskey, 1993). However, for both technical (limited degrees of freedom) and conceptual reasons (lack of evidence for party differences within countries), these results are a slender reed on which to rest the partisan model. Evidence from recent time-series cross-sectional tests is also problematic. First, they produce conflicting results. Some suggest that social and Christian democratic parties spend more (De Haan and Sturm, 1994; Rice, 1986; Roubini and Sachs, 1989), others that parties of the Left spend less (Ross, 1997), and still others that there is no relationship at all between partisanship and spending (Pampel and Williamson, 1988; Iversen, 2001). In addition, many of these studies have been criticized on technical grounds (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b) and revisions either have not been forthcoming or are inconclusive. Finally, recent evidence suggests that there is no relationship between partisanship and either budget deficits or public debt (Ross, 1997; Clark and Hallerberg, 2000; Hahm et al., 1996; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1998, 1999).

Although there is theoretical reason to believe that partisan differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes should exist, there is no strong and consistent evidence that this is the case. The evidence suggests that there was never a time (in the postwar period at least) in which political parties offered voters a clear choice in either macroeconomic policies or outcomes. This implies that the provisions for monetary union in the Maastricht Treaty cannot add to the democratic deficit in the European Union by constraining the macroeconomic choices of partisan national governments; partisan convergence had already occurred. However, it would be wrong to claim that empirical evidence for the absence of partisan macroeconomic policies before the 1990s is conclusive, because none of the studies mentioned above takes into account the pressures for ideological divergence or convergence created by different electoral systems.

Electoral systems and macroeconomic policies

Spatial models have traditionally been used to analyze the ideological positions taken by political parties (Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941; Black, 1958; Downs, 1957; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). However, few results derived from this research have been applied to questions concerning the impact of
partisan government on macroeconomic policy. This is despite the fact that voters in these models seem to assume a fairly direct connection between campaign promises and the policies that will be implemented after the election. One area of research on spatial models that seems particularly relevant to these questions focuses on the effects that electoral systems have on the ideological positions of parties (Cox, 1987, 1990a, 1990b; Greenberg and Weber, 1985; Shepsle and Cohen, 1990). Cox (1990b) has argued that electoral systems are characterized by either centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. Thus, some electoral systems encourage ideological convergence and some divergence. If this were true, one would expect to see greater partisan differences in macroeconomic policy and outcomes in those countries whose electoral systems promote ideological divergence. Partisan differences should be small or non-existent in centripetal systems. The recent empirical studies mentioned above do not take this into account and may, therefore, be underestimating the degree to which partisan differences exist.

There is clearly reason to believe that electoral institutions might shape macroeconomic policy by influencing the ideological positions taken by political parties.² It has long been known that electoral laws affect the number of political parties in a given party system (Duverger, 1954; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Cox, 1997), as well as the degree of disparity between vote shares and seat shares (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1994). However, research also suggests that electoral institutions influence the convergence and divergence of political parties (Cox, 1990a, 1990b; Shepsle and Cohen, 1990). This has important implications for the partisan literature, since we are unlikely to see partisan differences in those electoral systems that encourage ideological convergence.

Spatial models of elections have drawn on the economic literature explaining the location of firms in a one-dimensional market to analyze the ideological positions taken by political parties (Hotelling, 1929; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). Most models focus on two-competitor races in single-member districts and investigate the assumptions that underlie the prediction of ideological convergence on the median voter’s ideal point (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958). However, as Cox (1990b: 904) notes, ‘the basic logic of the spatial approach . . . is applicable in any electoral environment.’ Cox uses the spatial model to investigate how these tendencies are created by different electoral systems. Centripetal incentives lead political parties to implement centrist policies, whereas centrifugal incentives lead them to follow more extreme positions. The centrist or extremism of these policies can be understood not in terms of the content or substance of ideology, but only in terms of the array of opinions in a given electoral system (Cox, 1990b: 913). Cox’s general conclusions are that the dispersion of policies depends on (a) the number of votes
per voter, (b) whether partial abstention is allowed, (c) the size of the district magnitude, and (d) whether cumulation of votes is possible. These conclusions are applicable to both plurality and proportional representation systems.

The relationship between the number of candidates running for office and the number of seats available in an electoral district is the crucial factor determining whether partisan convergence occurs or not. Although the exact threshold where dispersion occurs varies depending on the specific electoral system, Cox’s general finding is that centripetal forces are less pronounced in plurality systems when the number of candidates is large. He also shows that proportional representation and plurality rule (without partial abstention or cumulative voting) are essentially identical. This means that the central factor limiting policy convergence is the number of electoral competitors. Cox (1990b: 919) goes on to note that the number of competitors is strongly determined by the district magnitude. As the district magnitude increases, the equilibrium number of competitors also increases (Cox, 1997, 1999). Thus, ideological divergence increases with district magnitude. This suggests that we should see greater partisan differences in electoral systems characterized by large district magnitudes. Partisan differences should be lower or nonexistent when district magnitude is low. Since we are specifically interested in how the electoral system affects partisan behavior, we chose to focus on the impact of district magnitude in this paper. Clearly, one could also focus on the number of competitors. Testing our argument with the effective number of parliamentary or elective parties as a proxy for the number of competitors does not affect our inferences.

The model

The standard model examining the influence of partisan orientation on fiscal policy is the following:

\[ \text{POLICY}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{LEFT}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{CONTROLS}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \]

where LEFT is some indication of government orientation in a one-dimensional left-right policy space. Typically, POLICY is some measure of a government’s propensity to use deficit spending or otherwise expand government involvement in the economy. If policy convergence were to occur, then POLICY would be independent of LEFT and \( \beta_1 \) would equal 0. If governments dominated by the Left were to behave in the manner predicted by the partisan model, then convergence would not occur and \( \beta_1 \) would be greater than 0. In order to incorporate constraints on partisan differences in fiscal
policy, be they capital mobility (Garrett, 1998), exchange rate regime (Oatley, 1999), or domestic fiscal institutions (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999; Clark and Hallerberg, 2000), it is necessary to use a multiplicative interaction model (Friedrich, 1982; Gill, 2001):

\[
POLICY_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LEFT_{it} + \beta_2 CONSTRAINT_{it} + \beta_3 (LEFT \times CONSTRAINT)_{it} + \beta_4 CONTROLS_{it} + \epsilon_{it}.
\]

If Cox’s argument about the effect of the electoral system on convergence and divergence in candidate positions is correct (and candidate positions are correlated with actual policies), then the electoral system is another constraint on partisan differences in fiscal policy. As we argued above, there is good theoretical reason to believe that district magnitude captures electoral system constraints. If MAGNITUDE measures logged median district magnitude in an electoral system, then we can test the effect of electoral laws on dispersion in fiscal policy with the following model:

\[
POLICY_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LEFT_{it} + \beta_2 MAGNITUDE_{it} + \beta_3 (LEFT \times MAGNITUDE)_{it} + \beta_4 CONTROLS_{it} + \epsilon_{it}.
\]

The conditional estimated causal effect of partisan orientation on fiscal policy is now given by \(\beta_1 + \beta_3 MAGNITUDE\). Since we expect policy to converge on the preferences of the median voter when MAGNITUDE = 0, we expect \(\beta_3 = 0\). (Note that MAGNITUDE is 0 when the median district magnitude is 1.) We expect partisan differences to increase as MAGNITUDE increases. Thus, we predict that \(\beta_3\) will be greater than 0 and that \(\beta_1 + \beta_3 MAGNITUDE\) will be greater than 0 when MAGNITUDE is ‘sufficiently’ high to induce dispersion.

We analyze the effects of partisan government on the change in government debt. We do this for two reasons. The first is that a focus on government debt allows us to analyze the impact of partisanship on a government’s overall fiscal stance. Thus, our results can easily be compared with several recent studies that take a similar approach (Clark and Hallerberg, 2000; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1998, 1999). The second is that it allows us to test whether the construction of a single currency damages the democratic process in European Union countries. One of the aims of the 1992 Maastricht convergence criteria was to force convergence by national governments on the level of debt that they held. As a result, governments of the Left and Right that wished to join a single currency were constrained to follow similar fiscal policies towards debt. Our model enables us to see whether partisan convergence on debt had already occurred prior to these institutional changes. We use an extension of Hallerberg and von Hagen’s (1999) times-series cross-sectional data set and the following model.
DEBT$_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{LEFT}_t + \beta_2\text{MAGNITUDE}_t + \beta_3\text{STRONG FINANCE MINISTER}_t + \beta_4\text{NEGOTIATED TARGETS}_t + \beta_5(\text{LEFT} \times \text{MAGNITUDE})_t
+ \beta_6(\text{LEFT} \times \text{STRONG FINANCE MINISTER})_t + \beta_7(\text{LEFT} \times \text{NEGOTIATED TARGETS})_t + \beta_8\text{LAGDEBT}_t-1 + \beta_9\text{UNEMP}_t
+ \beta_{10}\text{DEBTCOSTS}_t + \beta_{11}\text{GDP}_t + \Sigma(\beta_i\text{GOVERNMENT TYPE}_t) + \epsilon_t.

The dependent variable (DEBT) is the change in the ratio of gross debt to gross domestic product. LEFT is a coding for the partisanship orientation of the government. We report results based on two measures of partisanship. The first is from Woldendorp et al. (1993); the second is from Blais et al. (1993). MAGNITUDE is the logged median district magnitude in each country. STRONG FINANCE MINISTER is coded 1 when there is a strong finance minister, 0 otherwise. The inclusion of this variable is motivated by the fact that strong finance ministers generally serve as agenda-setters on the budget, have monitoring functions over the budgets of other ministries, and can strike out spending on some occasions when it is deemed excessive. NEGOTIATED TARGETS is coded 1 when coalition partners negotiate budgets for every ministry, and 0 otherwise. Hallerberg and von Hagen argue that these fiscal institutions (a strong finance minister and negotiated targets) constrain the use of fiscal policy for political purposes. LAGDEBT is a lagged dependent variable and measures the change in debt ratio lagged by one year, while UNEMP measures the change in the unemployment rate since the previous year. DEBTCOSTS represents the change in debt-servicing costs, which is computed as the change in the real interest rate minus the change in the growth rate times the gross deficit in the previous year. GDP measures the change in real gross domestic product. These economic variables are expected to influence the budget in a given year. Higher levels of unemployment and debt-servicing costs should increase government debt levels, while higher levels of economic growth should decrease debt levels. GOVERNMENT TYPE is a vector of dummy variables meant to capture the claim by Roubini and Sachs (1989) that the type of government affects the size of budget deficits. One-party majority governments maintain the tightest fiscal discipline, two- or three-party majority governments less so, and four- or five-party governments even less; minority governments, regardless of the number of parties in the coalition, are the most undisciplined.

The specification of this model is identical to that reported in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), except that we removed the exchange rate regime as a modifying variable and substituted MAGNITUDE instead. We dropped the variable for the exchange rate regime because Clark and Hallerberg found that it did not modify the effects of partisanship on fiscal policy in a manner consistent with theoretical predictions. Although we have stated the predicted
values for the coefficients, it is important to remember that the hypothesized modifying effects on the relationship between left governance and fiscal policy can best be gauged by examining the conditional coefficients for LEFT.

Figure 1 plots a hypothetical set of conditional coefficients consistent with our theoretical argument. The top line plots the conditional LEFT coefficient for the case where neither fiscal institution constrains the partisan use of fiscal policy. We do not expect left governments to affect changes in debt when MAGNITUDE equals 0 because electoral competition constrains dispersion. However, the estimated causal effect of left government should increase and eventually become distinguishable from 0 as MAGNITUDE increases. The slope of the lines plotting the conditional coefficients graphically captures the extent to which MAGNITUDE modifies the relationship between the partisan orientation of government and government debt. The adoption of constraining fiscal institutions, such as negotiated targets or a strong finance minister (SFM), ought to reduce the estimated causal effect of left governance on changes in debt irrespective of the district magnitude. The vertical distance

![Figure 1](image.jpg)

**Figure 1** The hypothesized effect of modifying variables on the effect of left governance on changes in government debt.
between the lines captures the size of this effect. The fact that these lines are parallel reflects our decision not to model the interaction between the modifying variables. As a result, the effect of a change in any modifying variable is constant across all values of the other modifying variables. The decision to place the line for the negotiated targets case below the line for the strong finance minister case was arbitrary. Their distance from the top line would be determined by the extent to which they constrain partisan behavior, and the literature does not indicate which has a greater constraining effect.

Results and interpretation

The results of our model can be seen in Table 1. In Model I we include the interaction terms for fiscal institutions (LEFT*STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and LEFT*NEGOTIATED TARGETS). These are dropped in Model II. Column A in both models uses the Woldendorp et al. (1993) measure of LEFT; column B uses the Blais et al. (1993) measure.9 It should be immediately obvious that the results in column IA do not fit the theoretical model very well. The fact that the coefficient for LEFT is not statistically distinguishable from 0 at the standard level of significance (95%) provides some evidence of partisan convergence in single-member districts (when neither of the constraints on the political manipulation of fiscal policy are present). This is consistent with the median voter theorem and the literature on spatial location. However, it would be wrong to place too much emphasis on this result since the coefficient is significant at the 90% level. Thus, it is arguable that there is some evidence of partisan differences where the formal literature on electoral competition predicts that we should find none. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on the interaction term LEFT*MAGNITUDE is negative and statistically significant. This implies that left governments decrease debt levels rather than increase them as district magnitude goes up.

The results on the other modifying variables do not fit our predictions either.10 Having a strong finance minister and negotiated targets does not seem to constrain the partisan use of fiscal policy as Hallerberg and von Hagen expect. The coefficient on LEFT*STRONG FINANCE MINISTER is negative but not statistically significant. Most surprising is the positive and significant coefficient on LEFT*NEGOTIATED TARGETS. This suggests that left governments are actually more likely to be associated with increased government debt when negotiated targets are employed than when they are not.

Figure 2 plots the relationship between the estimated conditional effect of a one-unit increase in LEFT on DEBT across the full range of observed
Table 1  The estimated causal effect of a government’s partisan orientation on changes in government debt as conditioned by district magnitude, 1981-92. Ordinary least squares regression

<table>
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<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
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Notes: Specifications in the A columns use the Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge measure of left; those in the B columns use the Blais, Blake, and Dion measure. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
values for MAGNITUDE under three of the four logically possible combinations of fiscal institutions. We do not show the full range of conditional coefficients on LEFT for the case when there is a strong finance minister and negotiated targets. As predicted by Hallerberg and von Hagen’s contention that these institutions are substitutes, we do not have any observations where both constraints are present. The sloping lines indicate the conditional coefficients for LEFT. If a coefficient on this line is significant at the 95% level, then this is indicated by an asterisk above that particular coefficient.

If there is no asterisk, then the coefficient at that point is not significant. Figure 2 should be compared with Figure 1, where we illustrated our hypothesized results. Clearly, they are very different. The middle line plots the conditional LEFT coefficients for the situation already discussed (in the absence of both a strong finance minister and negotiated targets). This was the top line in Figure 1. The line starts out near 0 as we expected, but slopes downward rather than upward. Thus, larger district magnitudes do not facilitate an increased link between the partisan orientation of government and debt in the manner predicted by the partisan hypothesis.

The effects of fiscal institutions are quite surprising. As we might expect, Figure 2 provides no evidence for the partisan argument when there is a strong finance minister. But, contrary to expectations, the only case where we find any evidence in favor of the partisan hypothesis is when there are

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**Figure 2**  The estimated conditional effect of an increase in LEFT (Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge) on DEBT at different levels of logged district magnitude and under alternative fiscal institutions.

Note: ---indicates conditional coefficient is significant at the 95% level.
negotiated targets. Adopting negotiated targets actually seems to encourage debt across a wide range of values for MAGNITUDE.

So what overall conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2? At a minimum, the link between the partisan orientation of government and fiscal policy is more complicated than current theory suggests. Evidence for the partisan model can be found only when there are negotiated targets and when district magnitude is relatively small. There is no evidence of a link between partisan government and fiscal policy that is consistent with the partisan hypothesis when negotiated targets are not present. In fact, there is evidence that governments dominated by left-wing parties tend to take on less debt than their right-wing competition when MAGNITUDE is large. Figure 3 plots the conditional coefficients derived from Model IB. The pattern is almost identical to that found in Figure 2. This suggests that the results discussed above are robust with respect to the choice of partisanship indicator.

These results are clearly not consistent with our theoretical expectations. As a result, we modified our model in several ways in order to verify the robustness of our findings. First, we removed the modifying effects of fiscal institutions (LEFT*STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and LEFT*NEGOTIATED TARGETS). Models IIA and IIB retain MAGNITUDE as a modifying variable, but treat STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and NEGOTIATED TARGETS simply as linear control variables. Once again, the coefficients for LEFT are

Figure 3  The estimated conditional effect of an increase in LEFT (Blais, Blake, and Dion) on DEBT at different levels of logged district magnitude and under alternative fiscal institutions.

Note: -- indicates conditional coefficient is significant at the 95% level.
positive, but not statistically significant. This fits our prediction that changes in debt are unrelated to the partisan composition of government in single-member districts. However, the coefficients on LEFT*MAGNITUDE are not consistent with our expectations. The negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that the effect of left-wing governments on changes in debt decreases as district magnitude goes up. This coefficient, however, never becomes significant.

Second, we removed the political variables that captured government type. We then removed STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and NEGOTIATED TARGETS. All the results were qualitatively similar. Thus, we can be confident that the absence of evidence for a relationship between MAGNITUDE and DEBT is not the result of collinearity with other political variables in the model. Third, we specified the model with country dummy variables. Again, the results were similar. Fourth, we tested whether district magnitude had a threshold effect. To do this we included a dummy variable for MAGNITUDE that distinguished plurality and PR electoral systems. Again our inferences were unaffected since the interaction term between LEFT and the dummy variable was never significant. Fifth, we specified the model using the effective number of parliamentary parties instead of MAGNITUDE. We also used the effective number of elective parties. These data were based on Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) formula and on electoral results from Mackie and Rose (1991). Although the sign on the interaction term is positive, it is never significant. As a result, our inferences are unaffected.

Finally, we tested our results over a longer time period. We had focused on the 1981–92 period because our primary interest was in determining whether European governments had been able to follow partisan fiscal policies in the years immediately prior to the introduction of the Maastricht convergence criteria. One might reasonably ask whether this was a representative period in which to investigate such a question given the increasing pressure towards economic convergence at this time. Our data on debt do not allow us to test our model before 1981. However, we did investigate the impact of partisan government on budget deficits, government revenues, and government spending from 1970 to 1989. We used the following model on a data set from Garrett (1998):

$$
\text{POLICY}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{LEFT}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{MAGNITUDE}_{it} \\
+ \beta_3 (\text{LEFT}^{*} \text{MAGNITUDE})_{it} + \beta_4 \text{LAGPOLICY}_{it-1} + \beta_5 \text{GDP}_{it} + \\
\beta_6 \text{UNEMP}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{OLD}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{1-16(COUNTRY DUMMIES)}_{it} + \\
\beta_{17-20} \text{(PERIOD DUMMIES)}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}.
$$

The partisanship variable (LEFT) is calculated slightly differently from the two measures used in our analysis since it also captures a measure of
encompassing labor market institutions (see Garrett, 1998). The variable OLD captures the size of the old age population. All of the other variables are self-explanatory. This model is in fact a slight variant of the model found in Garrett (1998). The major change is that we dropped the variables dealing with capital mobility. This is because Clark (forthcoming) has shown that they have no significant effect on fiscal policy. We also dropped countries that are not members of the European Union.

We found that the partisan orientation of governments had no effect on any of these indicators of fiscal policy, irrespective of the district magnitude. As a result, we have some confidence that our findings are not specific to the 1981–92 time period. Moreover, the fact that Garrett’s measure of partisanship also captures the extent to which encompassing labor market institutions are present means that this robustness check can also be thought of as a test of the social democratic corporatist version of the partisan argument. Consequently, our claim that partisan differences in fiscal policy do not occur even where they are encouraged by permissive electoral institutions appears to extend to this version of the partisan argument as well.

Conclusion

Since the power to tax and spend is viewed as a central activity of government, the possibility that EMU could constrain the fiscal policy choices of democratically elected governments is a cause of concern. However, if democratic control of fiscal policy is valuable because it allows voters to select from among competing teams implementing different policies, the current study suggests that one cannot lose what one does not have.

As we noted at the outset, recent studies have found little evidence of a systematic relationship between the partisan orientation of government and macroeconomic policy. One possible explanation for this was the failure of these studies to include the electoral system as a potential constraint on partisan macroeconomic policy. However, this paper illustrates that the inclusion of electoral constraints still fails to produce evidence in favor of the partisan model. A link between left governance and loose fiscal policy is observed only in special circumstances that are not consistent with extant theory in a straightforward manner. Specifically, there is evidence of a link between left governance and indebtedness only when negotiated targets are used and when district magnitude is limited. This link decreases in size as district magnitude increases. In those specifications where partisanship was not interacted with fiscal institutions, there was no evidence of partisan effects on fiscal policy. Consequently, if a systematic relationship between the partisan
orientation of government and fiscal policy exists, the lack of supporting evidence cannot be explained by the failure of previous studies to control for the potential modifying effects of electoral institutions.

This paper used various modifying variables to focus attention on those circumstances in which we most expect to observe partisan difference in fiscal policy – where district magnitude is large and where constraining fiscal institutions (negotiated targets or strong finance ministers) are absent. We found no evidence of partisan differences in debt levels under such conditions. It should also be noted that fixed exchange rates and mobile capital were common in the time and place considered here. Given that the Mundell–Fleming model states that both enhance fiscal policy effectiveness, one would expect fiscal policy to be an attractive instrument for incumbents pursuing partisan goals. Despite this, there is little or no evidence of partisan differences in fiscal policy in EU nations.

Clark (forthcoming) suggests that the absence of partisan differences may be the result of either electoral competition or the structural dependence of the state on capital. In the former case, partisan incumbents may be deterred from implementing their preferred policies because the structure of electoral competition compels them to implement policies aimed at the median voter. According to the latter argument, left-wing parties are deterred from implementing their preferred policies because the private control of investment decisions in capitalist systems means that owners of capital can credibly threaten to disinvest if the government pursues policies that are more distributional than they desire (Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988). Since we find no evidence of partisan differences where the literature on electoral competition suggests that they should occur, it is reasonable to conclude that the absence of partisan differences cannot be explained in a standard median voter framework. Thus, if it is the case that the absence of partisan differences is to be explained by either the structure of electoral competition or the structural dependence of the state on capital, the evidence presented in this study provides indirect support for the latter.

Appendix: data sources

Change in gross debt (DEBT) Gross government debt over GDP. The data came from the Statistical Annex of European Economy (various years).
Change in debt costs (DEBTCOSTS) Change in the real interest rate minus the change in the growth rate times the gross deficit in the previous year. Same data source as DEBT.
Change in gross debt lagged (LAGDEBT)  Change in gross government debt over GDP lagged by one year. Same data source as for DEBT.

Change in real gross domestic product (GDP)  Same data source as for DEBT.

Change in unemployment (UNEMP)  Same data source as for DEBT.

Partisanship (LEFT)  We use the 1993 (1998) Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (WKB) and the 1993 Blais, Blake, and Dion (BBD) measures of partisanship. WKB code governments on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 indicating a cabinet dominated by parties of the Left and 1 indicating a cabinet dominated by parties of the Right. A score of 3 indicates an equal balance between parties of the Left and Right or dominance by center parties. Scores of 2 and 4 indicate center–left and center–right coalitions respectively. Years of government change receive a score weighted by the share of the year occupied by each government. BBD code parties as ‘right’ (–1), ‘center’ (0), and ‘left’ (1) based on the expert judgements reported in Castles and Mair (1984). In general, parties with a mean expert score of 3.8 or below are coded as left, and those with a mean expert score of 6.3 or greater are coded as right. See BBD for details and exceptions. The percentage of cabinet posts held by parties of the Right are then subtracted from the percentage of cabinet posts held by parties of the Left and this difference is standardized so that a cabinet in which left (right) parties held all the seats would receive a score of 1 (–1).

Government type (GOVERNMENT TYPE)  The data for the three dummy variables – 2–3 party government, 4–5 party government, and minority government – are from Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999). They used the data appendix in the European Journal of Political Research (various years) to update the De Haan and Sturm (1997) measure of government type.

Fiscal institutions (STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and NEGOTIATED TARGETS)  These variables are coded 1 when the institution is present and 0 otherwise. Strong finance ministers generally serve as agenda-setters on the budget, have monitoring functions over the budgets of other ministries, and can strike out spending on some occasions when it is deemed excessive. Negotiated targets are present when coalition partners negotiate budgets for every ministry. Data appear in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).

Median district magnitude (MAGNITUDE)  This variable represents the district magnitude of the median legislator. If no seats were allocated above the district level, then the median legislator was taken as the total number of legislators divided by two. If seats were automatically allocated in tiers above the district level, then the number of legislators elected at the district level was found and divided by two to determine the median legislator. If seats were not automatically allocated in tiers above the district level, then the median legislator was determined by taking the total number of legislators and dividing by two. The magnitudes of each district in each country were
found and the one associated with the median legislator was used. These values were logged. The sources for these data can be found in Golder (2001).

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Notes

1 This notion of the democratic process is closely associated with the concept of party responsibility in analyses of American political parties. According to this concept, parties ‘should’ present alternative ideological positions preferred by different sections of the electorate, thereby giving voters a ‘choice’ rather than an ‘echo’ (Page, 1978; Morton, 1993; Monroe, 1983).

2 There is also theoretical and empirical evidence that electoral systems have a direct and unconditional effect on macroeconomic policy and outcomes (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2001; Lizzier and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b; Myerson, 1993). All of these studies posit that universal expenditures will be higher in proportional representation systems, whereas targeted expenditures are expected to be higher in plurality systems. Most of the models also predict that total government spending will be higher in plurality systems. We do not directly address this literature since we are specifically interested in the partisan effects of electoral systems. The literature mentioned above makes no distinction between politicians based on their ideological predilections; it simply focuses on how electoral systems shape a politician’s need to use fiscal policy to get re-elected.

3 The median district magnitude represents the district magnitude of the median legislator. This is preferable to the average district magnitude since it offers a better measure of central tendency in non-normal distributions (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997). This measure is logged to capture the intuition that the marginal causal effect of a unit change in district magnitude is smaller when the district magnitude is large.

4 The Maastricht Treaty imposed four convergence criteria that had to be met by those countries seeking to join the single currency. First, inflation rates could not be more than 1.5% above the average for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; second, average nominal interest rates could not be more than 2% above those for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; third, there could be no exchange rate realignments for at least two
years; and, fourth, the general government deficit to GDP ratio could not be more than 3% and the gross debt to GDP ratio could not be more than 60%.

One could examine the effect of partisanship on the actual mix of policy priorities within a government’s budget. A problem with this is that the convergence criteria of EMU include restrictions only on the overall level of government deficits and debt. They place no other specific constraint on the types of fiscal policy that partisan governments can implement. Thus, an evaluation of fiscal policies other than those dealing with debt or deficits would not allow us to see whether EMU had damaged the democratic process by constraining partisan fiscal policy. We should note at this point that we did run additional tests using budget deficits, total government spending, and total government revenues as alternative indicators of fiscal policy. The results were similar to those from our model dealing with debt and are available from the authors on request. We would like to thank Geoffrey Garrett for providing the data necessary for this analysis.

We are grateful to Mark Hallerberg for sharing these data. We supplemented his data with electoral system measures from Golder (2001). See the data appendix for a detailed description of the variables and their sources. Owing to the pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) nature of our data, several methodological issues had to be dealt with (Beck and Katz, 1995a, 1995b; Beck, 2001). First, we include a lagged dependent variable to mitigate serial correlation among the error terms. Second, we use panel-corrected standard errors to take account of heteroskedastic errors. We also checked for fixed effects by estimating a model with country dummies. Our inferences were not affected. Another inferential threat arises from the potential non-stationarity of the dependent variable. Since the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in each model is several standard deviations below one, we can be confident that a unit root does not characterize the dependent variable.

There is some controversy about whether growth in GDP should be included as an independent variable, because real GDP appears in the denominator on the left-hand side of the equation (see Borelli and Royed, 1995). A problem arises only if one views debt as a determinant of growth in GDP. Given that this is unlikely, we feel justified in including it as a control variable.

Although Roubini and Sachs’ claim has since been disputed by De Haan et al. (1999), we include these control variables for government type.

Column A uses data on all current European Union countries except Portugal. Column B uses data on all current European Union countries except Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal. These countries were excluded because partisan data were not available from Woldendorp et al. (1993, 1998) or Blais et al. (1993). Some countries in our sample (Austria, Finland, Sweden) were not actually members of the EU between 1981 and 1992. However, this is not a problem since our primary interest is in testing whether there were partisan differences in the fiscal policy of current members prior to EMU.

However, the results of a joint significance test justify the inclusion of the interaction terms in our model. The hypothesis that the coefficients on LEFT*MAGNITUDE, LEFT*STRONG FINANCE MINISTER and LEFT*NEGO T IATED TARGETS are all 0 can be rejected at the 99% level.
We do not show the results from the remaining tests owing to space constraints. However, they are all available from the authors on request.

References


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